The first few minutes following a major incident are critical. Realistic scenario training can give first responders the experience to help minimise further injury and damage.

Post-major-incident analysis tells us that in nearly all of the cases, what happens in the first few minutes has a significant effect on the number and types of casualties, damage and disruption. It is a time of uncertainty, lack of appreciation of the extent of what has occurred, and in many cases, fear. Without experienced direction and immediate guidelines, things can go wrong and the situation may be made worse.

Responding to life-threatening events

The vast majority of people, thank goodness, have never had to cope with a life-threatening event. Often the nearest they have come to it is a vehicle accident or illness. Although serious, these are relatively contained events where the parameters are likely to be known and generally understood. A weapon attack or an unexpected explosion are unpredictable and in the main, will be outside the cognisance of those involved. There is an expectation that security or postroom staff, receptionists, building management teams or front of house people will deal with it until the emergency services arrive. Depending on the location, availability and to a certain extent, luck, this could be three or four minutes or 15 minutes or more. Even then, the first person to arrive may also not have experienced this situation before.

The role of first responders

Are we expecting too much from these ‘first responders’? Previous articles in City Security magazine and elsewhere, particularly when debating Martyn’s Law, have discussed the need for training first responders. But where is the training going to come from in this type of situation? Certainly, the requirement under SIA licensing does not cover it. Online training, although adequate for routine everyday awareness, cannot hope to provide realistic life-threatening experience.

Some would argue that experience can come from our Forces, but recent conflicts such as Afghanistan, Bosnia and Iraq are in an entirely different environment and culture. A good example to illustrate this problem is to briefly analyse one of the aspects of the response procedure: the 4Cs – Confirm, Cordon, Clear & Control. In a life-threatening incident, a lot of people’s first reaction is to evacuate (Clear) people immediately to a safe place until the emergency services arrive to handle the situation.

The quickest way to evacuate a large building is to sound the fire alarm. However, once you have done this, you have lost control, because people will evacuate as they would in a fire practice or follow the fire exit signs. In other words, they might now walk right into the main threat.

This has happened on a number of occasions, causing deaths and serious injuries. This is why when the threat has been ‘Confirmed’ e.g. a person with a weapon, the next action is to stop any other person going near the threat – ‘Cordon’.

In actual fact, depending on the type of location, the Cordon and Clear go on together. It is similar to a pebble being thrown into a pond – the impact is the epicentre of the threat, the ripples are the progression of the Cordon and Clear, i.e. they start small but get bigger and bigger until the distance is considered safe.

Some would argue that you can get round this problem by giving first responders instant support, for example by having a security control room, supervisor or a management responsibility for coordinating the incident.

They will have the detailed procedures to be followed in the event of a serious incident. But it isn’t instant, is it? The first responder has to stop what they are doing and radio or phone to their support to explain the situation.

Look at the ‘Run, Hide, Tell’ advice – the Tell comes at the end when one is in a safe/safer place. Run is instant when trying to protect oneself and colleagues. It is also debateable whether the person manning the control room, supervisor or manager is any more experienced at handling this type of situation.

For most working in offices and other locations, there is no doubt that they are putting their personal safety and security initially in the hands of first responders, so they should be given every opportunity to fulfil that duty effectively. This can be achieved by realistic scenario training relevant to their environment and having quick-reference incident procedures to hand.

Dr John Wyatt MBE PhD

Former Bomb Disposal Officer and Commander of the UK’s High Risk Counter Terrorist Search Operations.

The Emergency Procedures User Handbook on Low Threat and High Impact situations, by Dr John Wyatt MBE, is for Small to Medium sized enterprises.

For more information and details on how to get your copy please email: jwyattassociates@live.co.uk

Read other articles from John Wyatt MBE

Search procedures help improve your protection services

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Over the years since Pan Am Flight 103 was destroyed over Lockerbie by a powerful mid-air explosion, killing 270 people, there have been a series of lengthy investigations, tests and court cases. One of the experts involved, Dr. John Wyatt MBE, provides a summary of the explosive tests and their conclusions.

On the evening of 21st December 1988, 31,000 feet above the small Scottish town of Lockerbie, Pan Am Flight 103 (Clipper ‘Maid of the Seas’) on a regular scheduled transatlantic flight bound for New York, was destroyed by a powerful mid-air explosion, killing all 259 passengers and crew and 11 people on the ground in Lockerbie.

It was the worst such disaster in Britain and one of the worst in the history of civil aviation.

Subsequent investigation by the UK Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) established that the explosion was caused by a terrorist bomb made of Semtex and placed in the airliner’s forward cargo hold.

After a lengthy investigation, an indictment for murder was issued against Abdelbaset al- Megrahi, Libyan Intelligence Officer and head of security for Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) and Lamin Khalifa Fhimah, LAA Station Manager in Luqa Airport, Malta.

After protracted negotiations and UN sanctions, Colonel Gaddafi, the Libyan leader, decided to hand over the two men in April 1999. The trial took place in a neutral country as agreed at Camp Zeist in Holland, in late 2000. On 31 January 2001 Megrahi was found guilty and jailed for life, Fhimah walked free.

After unsuccessful appeals, he applied to the Scottish Criminal Cases Review Commission (SCCRC) in September 2003 for his conviction to be reviewed. A huge amount of information, a lot of it new, had to be sifted through.

In June 2007, the SCCRC announced it would refer the case to the Court of Criminal Appeal in Edinburgh after it had found that he (Megrahi) ‘may have suffered a miscarriage of justice’.  My explosive tests in 2006 formed part of this new information.

The case against Megrahi centred around a number of key issues; clothing from Malta, fragments of a user manual for a Toshiba radio and tiny fragments of printed circuit board (PCB) from a timing mechanism.

The debris from the explosion was spread over 2,000 square miles onto farm land, forests, built-up areas etc. 10,000 pieces of debris were retrieved, labelled and stored. It was evident from the damage to certain items (from their obvious proximity to an explosion) that the bomb was in a particular Samsonite suitcase.

After further investigation it was discovered that most of the clothes came from a shop in Malta and that the bomb had been built into a Toshiba brand radio/cassette player. This type of bomb had recently been recovered during a terrorist incident in West Germany, so the UK’s forensic scientist from the Royal Armament Research and Development Establishment (RARDE) visited the Bundeskriminalamt (BICA) laboratories in Wiesbaden in January 1989.

Although the fragments from Lockerbie were not exactly the same, they were very similar and found to be from a ‘sister’ Toshiba radio/cassette player. The German discovery started with a raid on known PFLP-GC (Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General ~Command) people in October 1988.

Several people were arrested and guns, grenades and explosives including a bomb hidden inside a Toshiba with an altitude switch were recorded. The German police found four bombs, but had reason to believe there had been five. Was the fifth bomb placed on Pan Am 103? These people had been under surveillance for some time including when they travelled to Malta for meetings.

You would have thought that this was a considerable breakthrough, particularly when added to the USS Vincennes mistakenly shooting down Iranian Air Flight 655, in the Gulf.  Iran vowed to avenge the 290 people who died and supposedly tasked the PFLP-GC (one Ahmed Jibril). Then, suddenly, there was an about turn in the investigation and everyone’s attention turned to Libya.

There were supposedly two main reasons for this. Firstly, the Maltese-labelled clothing and the owner of the shop, Paul Gauci, who said he recognised Megrahi from 18 months earlier.  However, Gauci changed his story several times and had seen a picture of Megrahi before being interviewed by the Police – he was considered an unreliable witness at the Appeal. It would seem that investigators also ignored the fact that they found clothes from the same shop in the apartment of Abu Talb (member of PFLP-GC).

Secondly and most importantly a small (10 x 9.2 x 1.6 mm) fragment of a PCB was traced to a MEBO MST–13 timer made by a Swiss Company and sold solely to Libya. This was exhibit number PT 356 and was only found in a shirt in 1990.  Answers to a number of questions concerning PT 356 proved difficult to tie down in the appeal investigation.  When and where was it recovered and by whom was it found?  Was it swabbed for explosives or other traces?  Where are the continuity records?  Other aspects also ‘muddied the waters’.

The Swiss Company was run by Edwin Bollier.  He claims that he was originally shown a fragment of brown 8-ply circuit board which came from a prototype timer never supplied to Libya. At the trial this fragment became a green 9-ply circuit board, from the MST-13!

In May 2000, Dr Rosemary Wilkinson, a bio-medical expert at Strathclyde University carried out an analysis of this item using a scanning electron microscope (SEM) and found no evidence of it being adjacent to an explosive detonation; absence of pitting, no coating of the specimens with foreign material, no evidence of local melting (solder melts at 183 degrees while Semtex would generate in the region of 2000 degrees) and finally the edges of the fragment show no explosive damage such as tearing, the cut appears to be mechanical.

As a result of my involvement in the early stages of the investigation in 1989 with Professor Paul Wilkinson of Aberdeen University, my appearance as an expert witness at the Supreme Court of Appeal in two high profile terrorist cases and my PhD in explosive engineering, I was asked to carry out an explosive test to assess more accurately the results of a similar explosion that occurred on Pan Am 103 to clear up these anomalies.

There had been nine explosive tests carried out in the USA between 18 April and 25 July 1989. Seven were done at Indianhead near Washington DC and two at Atlantic City under the auspices of the FAA and RARDE. On reading the reports from these tests, there seemed to be little planning or formal post-explosive analysis documentation.

In order to obtain accurate information, one needs to do the same test at least three times to ensure consistency in the results. The next series of tests should only change one significant factor otherwise one doesn’t know which factor has produced a different result.  We eventually carried out nineteen tests – from a single radio to a full aircraft container of suitcases. For all but the last test we used an indoor range at Faldingworth so that we could be certain that we had registered all the fragments/materials post explosion.

The first series of tests used a single radio, filled with 400 grams of Semtex – the amount deduced from the US tests derived from the necessary break-up of the plane.  I have been involved with explosives for over 50 years and thought that when I went into the arena after the first explosion, I would see small bits of radio scattered over the area. To my astonishment there was nothing, just dust. For subsequent tests, we included a PCB to simulate the timer made out of the same material and painted dayglo yellow so that we could pick out any fragments more easily.

Despite packing the radio into a suitcase with clothes surrounding it and then other packed suitcases surrounding the prime suitcase, the results of the debris were the same – no sign of the PCB.  We did vary the charge weight on some tests as a comparison. The only time we got a small piece of debris from the PCB was Test 15 when we used only 150 grams of explosive, but in this case the overpressure and impulse gauges confirmed that this would be insufficient to cause the plane to break up.

Apart from the lack of any fragment of the PCB, it is also known that epoxy resin board (FR4) despite being flame resistant dissolves at about 200 degrees. Some will argue that tests at ground level do not replicate the event at 31,000 ft.  Generally, I would agree, but not in the immediacy of the explosion. The time taken from peak pressure to ambient pressure is less than half a millisecond. This would not have made any difference to the PCB fragmentation.

Our conclusions were that it was virtually impossible for a fragment of 10 x 9.2 x 1.6mm to have survived this explosion. This evidence, of course, was not heard by the Appeal as Megrahi was released in 2009 on compassionate grounds before that stage was reached.

I am not sure where the recent development of Abu Agila Masud, also a Libyan Intelligence officer, supposedly confessing in 2012 to the bombing, leaves us, unless he was working for the PFLP-GC. His likely involvement in the Berlin discotheque bombing in 1986 may support this. But if this is the right connection and the bomb was the fifth not retrieved by the Bundeskriminalamt, then the evidence against Megrahi is unsafe to say the least.

It has always been the case that the US relatives of those who died want closure whereas the UK relatives doggedly led by Jim Swire want the truth.  Aamer Amrar, the lawyer leading the current Megrahi appeal, criticises the timing of this announcement, alleging it was an attempt to ensure the appeal failed. Like the early release of Megrahi himself, is this another attempt to save the embarrassment of a mistrial?

Dr. John Wyatt MBE

For further information contact: jwyattassociates@live.co.uk

For related articles see our category: Counter Terrorism

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In May of this year, I celebrated 50 years in counter terrorism and High Risk Security. In those years a lot has happened in this field both in terms of threat and countering that threat. If you asked me ‘what was the one thing that has made a significant difference in providing protection?’ I would argue that it is in practical guarding search procedures.

What’s the history?

Before the early 1970s there were no formal search procedures which were taught to security forces. The situation in Northern Ireland soon led the British Army to realise that something was needed, otherwise the IRA were always one step ahead.

Royal Engineers lead the way

Since the Royal Engineers already carried out mine clearance and ‘booby-trap’ clearance as part of their combat engineer training, they were the natural choice to lead the way. They also had tradesmen like bricklayers, electricians and plumbers who would understand how a building was put together and functioned. Training was based at the Royal School of Military Engineering in Chatham. However, these skills, particularly at basic level, were required in everyday operations so all the rest of the Army sent selected teams to be trained there just before going on tour to Northern Ireland. This included the Royal Marines and RAF Regiment.

It was only in 1984 after the Brighton bomb that Police Forces also realised that they needed training in search procedure skills. Having commanded the UK High Risk Search teams for a number of years, I ran the first Police Search Adviser (POLSA) course in November of that year.  Now all the Police Forces in the UK have several POLSAs who are responsible for coordinating operations and running training courses in their own constabularies.

So what are Search Procedures?

These are the systematic procedures used to find weapons, explosives or other contraband. There are procedures for body (and bag), vehicle, building, area and route search. Each discipline has its ‘system’ to ensure that the chance of success in finding threatening or illegal items is that much higher than just checking those areas you think are most likely to hide items. We see searching carried out in a variety of situations these days, the most common being at airports. But there are many other examples where a restricted area may require this procedure, for instance at museums, at international events/exhibitions or even global events such as the G9 Conferences, or climate change conferences – anything that might be an emotive issue to which there could be demonstrations or a threat to the establishment.

Who can carry out search procedures?

At a lot of these venues the search is carried out by ‘security personnel’ and not the Army or Police. These are only deployed at the very High Risk events. The SIA licence in the UK does not include formal search training so, unless they subsequently receive training from a qualified Search Adviser, their skills are going to be severely limited. With the increase in violent weapons threat after the events in Paris, Denmark and Belgium, organisations in large cities are considering ‘airport like’ searches at their Reception. Initially it may only be visitors and contractors that are subject to this and it may be just a quick check of a bag/briefcase rather than a body search, but should the threat persist this may increase.

However, one must remember that there is no right to search an individual. One has to ask their permission, but should they refuse you do have the right to then refuse entry.

Searching and delays

One of the issues with searching in a Low Risk environment is that it causes delay, queues and thus annoyance. In this case the searcher is told to speed up – after all, it is only deterrent, isn’t it?  As with many tasks, it is only worth doing if it is done well. It has been proved that if a bag search has been done professionally, say to 1 person in 3 or 4, it is much more of a deterrent than searching everyone badly. Assuming the would-be assailant carries out a reconnaissance, he will soon see how to take advantage of a poor search, but if the search is done well and almost certain to find the hidden device, he will not take that risk. This also touches on another extremely important point – that is pride in doing a job well.

Giving confidence to security guards

A lot of security guards are treated with disdain. The people they are supposedly protecting look down on them as menial workers with low intelligence. So something that is done well and professionally will give them confidence and pride in their role.

The bag search

In a city environment or at a major event, the most likely type of search is bag search. It would appear to be simple and straight-forward – it is, but I am amazed at the number of occasions I see it done inadequately. The first ‘golden rule’ is for the searcher NOT to put their hands into another person’s bag. How many times have you seen this at major UK airports?

The argument is probably that it speeds the search up if the searcher just gets on and empties or rummages in the bag. There are two very good reasons for not putting your hands in. Firstly, the searcher could be accused of stealing something, jewellery or cash for instance. Having been searched like that I could walk through security and then 5 minutes later come back and say my gold watch or £500 in cash has been stolen.

The CCTV will show that the only person who has had access to that bag is the searcher. The searcher would not ‘have a leg to stand on’! Secondly, for safety reasons it is not sensible to ‘dive’ into someone else’s bag. There may be ‘sharps’ in there on which the searcher could be cut or pricked.

I have heard of people purposely putting a syringe with unsheathed needle attached in their bag because they were fed up with being searched.

If you cannot see properly into a bag, ask the owner to remove items so that you can see.  Any enclosed items such as spectacle cases, purses etc. one can again ask the owner to open them. But what do you do with the beautifully wrapped present (son’s birthday present)? You cannot ask them to unwrap it, that is unreasonable, but equally you cannot allow it to pass as it might be an IED or weapon. Access to an X-ray is a good way out or failing that, could they leave it in Reception and pick it up on the way out?

What if you find something sensitive?

In most cases the security personnel are there for the safety of the organisation and those who work there. So what do you do if you find something embarrassing or sensitive, e.g. drugs? You are not there to make moral judgements. However, if drugs are used on the premises, it may inadvertently harm others. The answer is not to make an issue of it, but subsequently report it to their line manager for any appropriate action.

Body Search

The above procedure requires plenty of space and of course a table upon which to place the bag. This is similar to the requirement for body search. This type of search has improved considerably at airports – remember Richard Reid, ‘the shoe bomber’, and Umar Farouk Abdulmallab, the ‘crutch bomber’.

All overcoats, jackets and sometimes shoes now go through the conveyor X-ray.  A lot of organisations do not have this luxury at their premises. Body search for this type of threat is actually very quick and simple. First ask the visitor to remove any outer clothing, coat, mac etc. and check the pockets. Then ask them to remove any large items out of other pockets, onto the table. There are actually only 3 areas in which a person can hide anything substantial like a weapon: in the armpits, in the small of the back and in the crutch area.

Searching these areas using the correct part of the hand (the V between thumb and forefinger for armpits and crutch and the flat of the hand for the small of the back) need only take seconds.

Random vehicle searches

Those with underground car parks or large loading bays may also consider random vehicle search. Again this does not need to take forever. A very effective search can be carried out in 10-15 minutes if the search areas are split into systematic sections, e.g.  bonnet (engine), boot (load carrying), underneath, outside and inside. On my last training session for a large City building, the security team were easily able to find a concealed hand-gun, 200gms of explosive and a large knife in that time.

Justifying searches

I can almost hear some Building/Facility Managers on reading this saying search procedures would not work or would not be acceptable in my building. All the while the threat appears to be low (although at the time of writing it is considered ‘Severe’ from international terrorism) they may be right. But what happens when the UK suddenly gets hit with a similar incident to those that have recently occurred in Europe and Canada?

Everyone clamours for better security

They do not want it next month, they want it now in case there is a similar attack immediately after. It is too late to start considering what to do and how to train their security teams. For any type of threat, planning and preparation are key.

Train your team now

Search procedures are already being stepped up in many visitor attractions such as museums and theme parks in addition to more and more single and multi-tenanted buildings in the City of London and other key cities throughout the UK. Now is the time to train your security team. Both Body & Bag and Vehicle Search only take a couple of hours when 6 or 8 are trained at once and it will give the individuals increased self-esteem and pride in their professionalism.

Training in situ

I know that some organisations throw this suggestion back to their contract guarding company, saying it is their responsibility to train them in these extra skills. This does not work, as almost without exception, these companies are only geared up to train to meet SIA requirements. They do not possess a qualified Search Adviser. Also, it is much better that the training is carried out in the environment in which it is going to be used so that any peculiarities or idiosyncrasies of the building operation are ironed out.

The benefits of these procedures will soon become apparent, particularly as little time and cost is incurred. The skills learnt will also have a positive outcome in many other associated roles such as communication, awareness and observation.

Consider it now, while you have time rather than be panicked.

Dr John Wyatt MBE PhD MIExpE

The Emergency Procedures User Handbook on Low Threat and High Impact situations, by Dr John Wyatt MBE, is for Small to Medium sized enterprises. For more information and details on how to get your copy please email: jwyattassociates@live.co.uk

For more articles from Dr John Wyatt MBE, see:

Your life in their hands: training first responders for major incidents is critical

For more articles on related areas, see  Security Management, Security Guards and Security guard dogs

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The effects of blast from a bomb containing high explosive can be devastating both in terms of damage to structures and injuries to human beings.

I say ‘can’ because it is not true in every case despite what we see regularly in films and on the TV. It all depends on the type of explosive, its weight (quantity) and its location.  Additionally, in terms of the location it depends on the distance away it is, the immediate environment and the angle of incidence.

Bomb blast: IED

An explosion produces several effects on its surroundings. These are primarily in the form of a shock wave composed of a high pressure shock front (fast moving pressure discontinuity in the atmosphere) which expands outward from the centre of the detonation, with the pressure intensity decaying rapidly with distance. As the wave front hits an object (structure or human body), this pressure exerts a load on that object. This violent release of energy from the exploding substance is characterised by an almost instantaneous rise from the ambient pressure to a Peak Incident Pressure.  Incident pressure is the pressure on a surface parallel to the direction of the blast wave. This pressure increase (shock front) travels radially from the burst point with a diminishing velocity which is always in excess of the speed of sound in the gas. Gas molecules making up the front move at slightly lower velocities and cause the ‘winds’ produced by the shock fronts. As the shock front expands, the peak pressure at the front decreases and the duration of the pressure increases.

So to put it simply, what you have is an initial short sharp punch followed by a less strong but longer push. A typical duration of an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) is in tens of milliseconds. Even a large vehicle borne IED (LVBIED) of say 500kg TNT equivalent has only a duration of 20msec at 20m. A lot of structures, materials and the human body can sustain a short sharp punch as they have the ability to move with the punch rather than be rigid or brittle.

Glass is, surprisingly, actually not too bad if the punch is only a few milliseconds long.  However, the more damaging effect is the push. This is called the impulse and is more difficult to protect against.

Protection against bomb blast

The best protection against blast is of course prevention, i.e. stop the explosion occurring at all by good security measures. The problem here is that we all want to live in a relaxed atmosphere with freedom of movement and social integration. Effective security measures are not complementary to this so we have to achieve a balance, e.g. increased security at higher risk situations such as air travel, gatherings of large numbers of people and VIP events, but little or no intrusive security elsewhere. This means we have to adopt physical methods of blast protection in this latter situation – even in the former as well if we are not totally confident in the security measures.

The word ‘energy’ was used to describe the result of a substance exploding. This cannot be wholly protected against, a better word is mitigate, i.e. manage that energy so that it is not so destructive. Energy can be dissipated over distance and time and it can be used up by making it work. In many circumstances, particularly in  cities, increasing the stand-off (distance) is not practical so channelling or diverting the blast wave may be a better option. If this is combined with using up some of that energy by causing destruction of a sacrificial element e.g. a blast wall, then the principal element may be better protected.

Vulnerable infrastructure

Most commercial and government buildings in modern cities are built using framed structures, reinforced concrete or steel. These, because of their dynamic movement, are more resilient to blast. However, it is the enclosure that now becomes more vulnerable. The use of glass both as windows and curtain walling is widespread. Annealed or float glass easily fragments into lethal shards; toughened or heat-tempered glass has certainly more resilience, but that too will fragment into small ‘diced’ pieces if the impulse is sufficiently high.  Laminated glass with its single or multiple polyvinyl-butyral (pvb) interlayer performs much better as the pvb allows some movement and, although it may fail, does not fragment. Equally, it provides further protection from cased element (primary) fragmentation of the bomb itself.

A vehicle bomb or suicide bomb with ball bearings will disperse ‘bullets’ in all directions.  Statistics show that there are more deaths and injuries due to fragmentation in a bomb explosion than anything else. Both annealed and toughened glass can be improved considerably by the application of anti-shatter film retrospectively.

The use of the IED is a worldwide problem as it has more impact than most other terrorist/criminal activity – the visual signs remain sufficiently long enough for the media to obtain graphic pictures. Providing better blast and fragmentation protection may help to reduce this threat.

Dr. John Wyatt, MBE PhD

Principal

www.filmtek.org

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