As plans for business travel resume, how do you keep safe, particularly from the threat of espionage?

Since the advent of globalisation, international business travel has been considered a necessity when conducting business across country borders. When tools such as video conferencing became more widely available during the 1990s, many believed international business travel would decline, but instead, until coronavirus hit globally in early 2020, the sector had continued to grow year on year to a peak of business tourism spending of $1.29 trillion in 2019.

Now, 18 months into a global pandemic, many are looking at plans for resuming business travel as more countries see reductions in their case numbers, more people become vaccinated and confidence grows in travel sector safety procedures. However, as well as the health and safety considerations of recommencing business travel, what are the important things to consider from a security viewpoint, and particularly from an espionage threat perspective?

International business travel: still necessary or desirable?

Within the travel sector, there has been considerable debate about the recovery of business traveller volumes and spend. For the airline industry, business travellers have historically accounted for 12% of the volume but up to 75% of profits, so the industry is keen to encourage the return of business travel to pre-pandemic levels.

However, for many organisations who have been permitted to travel under essential worker status, the complexity of international travel has posed significant challenges. Even as countries are now opening up their borders, the advice and requirements in place are complex, immensely varied and quick-changing. The rules around vaccination requirements, quarantine and self-isolation have already limited, and will continue to limit, business travel for some time to come until we emerge from this pandemic globally.

Alongside the practical considerations, many organisations are re-evaluating their business travel volumes from both environmental and Corporate Social Responsibility standpoints. Pre-2020, many companies, including PwC, Microsoft and Lloyds Banking Group, had committed to reducing or limiting their business travel emissions with the recognition that air travel contributed the most to carbon emissions. A study by O2 Business in June 2020 also showed that 48% of UK workers were concerned about the negative environmental impact of business travel , while investors are increasingly applying ESG (environmental, social and corporate governance) criteria to company investment decisions. Certainly, all of these factors point to a continued downward trend in international business travel.

But what is the desire to return to international business travel among the workforce? Changes in working practices since early 2020 including greater levels of remote working, accepted flexible working policies helping to accommodate operating across time zones, and improved dependability and functionality of video conferencing software have all helped to facilitate more effective international communication and collaboration. But many miss face-to-face interaction, and it is widely accepted that meeting with colleagues, business partners, suppliers and clients in person serves to strengthen relationships. There are also many occasions when travelling to a country is still essential; some services simply cannot be delivered remotely.

Staying secure when travelling internationally

From a security perspective, international business travel has always presented risks. The transportation of organisational assets, both tangible and intangible, poses a risk of interception and theft and from an espionage threat perspective, an adversary is aware of the vulnerabilities of an unfamiliar location or situation where the usual home country security protocols cannot be followed or maintained. With the conditions of resumed business travel as we’ve already explored, any international business requirement is likely to be more critical and involve personnel handling more sensitive assets and conducting more sensitive conversations and the adversary will be very aware of this shift.

When advising organisations on safe international business travel, we advocate three key disciplines: briefing, discretion and being environment-aware.

Briefings

Being well briefed on how to keep assets secure and location-specific risks and factors are essential for any business traveller, especially so for any employees who had not received such training or advice pre-pandemic but equally for seasoned travellers who need risk updates.

Disseminating foreign travel advice from local government and gaining insight from corporate travel partners are one level of education, but many organisations are now going further to build and share their own local threat assessments cross-company.

Discretion

The mantra for any business traveller should always be discretion. It can be easy to become exposed or overly relaxed when abroad, and time-old espionage techniques such as honeypot traps continue today as the adversary preys on these vulnerabilities. The case in 2020 of a US defence linguist charged with sharing highly sensitive national defence information with a member of Lebanese Islamist militant group Hezbollah with whom she shared a romantic interest shows evidence of this risk . As well as being discreet at in-person events, the dangers of sharing information via social media and professional networks have been highlighted of late, and the US NCSC ‘The Nevernight Connection’ video showcases this perfectly.

Environment-aware

As well as specific country or city risk factors, the business traveller should maintain a heightened level of awareness around transport hubs, hotels and third-party venues where their usual organisational security protocols are not in place. The use of hotel safes, storage and hardware are best avoided, as is leaving any device or asset in a hotel room. Measures such as providing clean IT equipment can be advisable for locations and situations considered high risk.

A shift in security service resourcing?

For many security professionals, the COVID-19 pandemic has presented some challenges in respect of maintaining key security service delivery as their preferred or contracted suppliers have been unable to travel themselves. For some organisations, this has forced them to review their sourcing models and focus on more local solution providers for protective services to avoid future travel risk and disruption. However, for certain fields and specialisms, it can be difficult to find reputable providers and apply the same best-practice sourcing criteria across countries.

TSCM, for example, is a notoriously unregulated industry. It is important to find a provider that applies industry-leading standards and uses highly trained personnel and specialist equipment to give the same level of threat assurance across all operations and projects to ensure you are protected.

Emma Shaw

MD, Esoteric

www.esotericltd.com

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The world changed overnight; safety and security are viewed through a very different lens from just months ago and change daily.

People are as frightened of falling victim to disease as they are of terrorist attack. The hotel industry has faced the full force of the impact.

What needs to be done now and what will be the new normal?

We are really only beginning to appreciate the pandemic’s impact on traditional approaches to security. We have always pitted ourselves against malignly motivated individuals whose objectives involve causing harm or loss to others. Now, as well as continuing to out-think our traditional adversaries, we have to protect our clients, staff, the public and our properties against unwitting agents who may pose a greater risk than many of our conventional security opponents.

Health Security perimeter

The first challenge is identifying the innocent virus carrier. Until tamper-proof assurance is available that a person is virus-free, security planning must assume that everyone is a potential conduit. The emerging concept is of a health security perimeter that goes further, requiring that people, animals and objects must be screened as a condition of entry. Pre-preparing guests, staff and visitors about this approach is essential, but most people have already demonstrated their willingness to moderate their convenience for safety. They are familiar with security protocols in airports and public places, and are now used to mantras like ‘stay at home’, so it is a small step for travellers and guests to co-operate with the philosophy of a health security perimeter and a ‘screen it or clean it’ maxim.

Extend the perimeter

The screening policies need to positively extend the perimeter beyond the boundary of the hotel.  For example, trusted suppliers will demonstrate and document a contamination-free chain of custody to a specific hotel. If not, their goods are either not allowed in or ‘quarantined’ in a controlled area where they can be subject to hygiene protocols.

What would have been objectionable just a few months ago now seems inevitable; for example, internal contact-tracing, a key step to gain the confidence of the authorities. An essential outcome of a contact-tracing procedure is the ability to alert those at risk following contact, and the targeting of hygiene and cleaning efforts. CCTV usage takes on an added dimension with this purpose in mind.

Valuing hotels as bases to explore new surroundings, travellers will cross our health security perimeter on numerous occasions during their stay. Screening on each entry will be required but within proportionate bounds.

Ground rules for guests and staff

Hotels will wish to revisit policies and procedures, training and T&Cs to ensure that new measures are explained and the ‘ground rules’ for entry are understood before guests arrive.

Staff involvement in health security will be key. Yet, staff latitude to move around within the health perimeter may make it proportionate to require that they undertake COVID-19 testing but can this be compelled, and results disclosed?

Where it is a contractual term then, arguably, yes; but where not, challenges may arise. Temperature screening at the health perimeter and a written undertaking that the staff member or a household member has no COVID-19 symptoms should be the norm before commencing duty inside the health perimeter.

Meeting the needs of all

Undoubtedly, this disease hits the disadvantaged hardest. Any thoughtful security strategy must meet the needs of people who rely on mobility aids, wheelchairs and guide dogs. Respecting dignity for all whilst undertaking the deadly serious work of health security screening will be a mark of accomplishment in this new security field.

New strategies and tactics must be effective yet delivered with a style intended to be welcoming and hospitable. The impression of a hotel as part-med lab/part-prison will not work, but neither will mere lip service to health security standards which guests can see being obviously flouted. Necessary, proportionate and well-managed procedures will be accepted – no more but no less.

Public generosity and support observed through this crisis has encouraged criminals to adapt, corrupting the supply chain and exploiting the opportunity to make false claims and threats. Hotels and businesses will need to be alert to these.

Achieving all this won’t be easy: the professional disciplines of health, safety and security have evolved within different regulatory frameworks with more or fewer standards. Yet there is no doubt that health security is here to stay, requiring blended expertise that is independently validated and providing much needed confidence for travellers and those with a duty of care for their safety and security. Hopefully, COVID-19 will pass but the increased emphasis on safety, security and hygiene is likely to be with us for far longer.

David Wood

CEO, Global Secure Accreditation Ltd

www.gsaccreditation.com

The post Hotel Health, Safety & Security – the new normal appeared first on City Security Magazine.

An overview of terrorist attacks on passenger rail networks in Europe and North America focused on current and emerging tactical and targeting trends.

It is now over 13 years since the 7/7 bombings inflicted mass casualties across the London transport network on the morning of 7 July 2005. In the interim period, railway networks and subway systems in Europe and North America have remained the target of a large number of terrorist plots and attacks featuring a number of attack methodologies.

The Current Security Threat Analysis

On the morning of 22 March 2016, Islamic State (IS) carried out the bombing of the Maalbeek Metro Station in Brussels as part of a coordinated improvised explosive device (IED) attack on rail and aviation targets in the Belgian capital. Twenty people were killed and over 100 others injured in the attack. The cell responsible for the attacks was part comprised of the wider network that carried out the 13 November 2015 marauding assault on multiple locations in Paris.

Since the Brussels bombing, there have been additional successful or attempted attacks on rail networks in several major cities including London, St Petersburg, Brussels and New York. Whilst only the St Petersburg attack on 3 April 2017 resulted in any fatalities, the terrorist threat to rail passenger networks across the Western world remains high and will continue to pose a major threat to public safety and business operations for the foreseeable future.

Why Rail Networks?

Rail passenger facilities typically rely on open architecture and are designed to facilitate the free flow of large numbers of passengers across the network. This increases the vulnerability of the network to attack by placing limitations on the viability of increased security measures which do not result in unreasonable delay and inconvenience to commuters. The fact that rail networks naturally extend over a large area also provides terrorist operatives with multiple points of entry into and exit from the facilities. In addition, the existence of vast rural stretches are inevitably highly challenging to effectively patrol and secure.

Security Threat Analysis: Attack Methodologies

There are a number of frequently used methods of attack against rail networks, including bladed weapons and IEDs. Less frequently, attacks have also involved the use of firearms; for example, the 21 August 2015 failed IS-inspired attack on a Paris-bound train in Thalys, which was thwarted by the intervention of three American tourists who wrestled the gunman to the ground.

Less orthodox attack methodologies include the 20 March 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system by the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo. The liquid sarin was deployed in plastic bags which were punctured by the terrorist operatives in multiple train carriages. The attack killed 12 people and injured over 1,000 others. Whilst a range of terrorist groups have continued to demonstrate interest in attacks using chemical or biological weapons, the resources and technical capability required to manufacture a chemical or biological agent are prohibitively high for many aspiring hostile actors, rendering it an unfeasible methodology.

A further possible method is deploying a train derailment device for use against passenger trains travelling at high speed, a tactic which has been promoted in several high-profile jihadist magazines. The first documented reporting of such a device being used for this purpose was of an attack in early October 2018 against an inter-city passenger train travelling between Nuremberg and Munich. Although the device failed to derail the train, its impact upon the vehicle was felt by the driver. Threatening letters in Arabic and Arabic graffiti indicating an Islamist extremist motive were subsequently recovered at the scene of the attack.

IED Attack Trends

The vast majority of IED attacks on passenger rail networks in Europe and North America in recent years have featured the use of devices initiated by a timer or a suicide operative. Examples include the 15 September 2017 Parsons Green bombing and the 11 December 2017 failed suicide attack in a tunnel adjoining the New York Subway. Suicide IEDs give a number of tactical advantages to the operative, including the ability to make last-moment alterations to the location in which the device is functioned. Suicide attacks also eliminate the possibility that a suspicious package would be identified and the area evacuated before the device is functioned.

Radio-controlled devices have also been used on a number of occasions in this period, most notably in Al-Qaeda’s 11 March 2004 coordinated attacks on multiple train carriages in Madrid which killed 192 people and injured over 2,000 others. The attack remains the most lethal single terrorist incident to have taken place in Europe this century.

A large percentage of the IED attacks identified in this period were carried out during the morning rush hour (defined as 0700hrs to 1000hrs) on weekdays, almost certainly also due to a desire to maximise the number of casualties in the attack.

In recent years, a large number of terrorist IEDs in Europe and North America have failed to function as intended, or at all, due to technical or material deficiencies in the device. Examples of this include the 15 September 2017 Parsons Green attack and the 11 December 2017 New York Subway bombing. Although a fireball was caused by the initiation of the detonator in the Parsons Green incident, the TATP main charge did not explode, reducing the effectiveness and lethality of the device. Notably, in the context of recent attacks in Europe and North America, the majority of perpetrators whose devices successfully functioned appear to have spent time fighting alongside jihadist terrorist organisations in foreign conflict theatres. These include members of the extended terror cell who perpetrated the 13 November 2015 Paris attacks and the 22 March 2016 Brussels attacks, Salman Abedi, who carried out the 22 May 2017 suicide attack on the Manchester Arena, and Ahmad Khan Rahimi, the individual behind the 17-19 September 2016 New York and New Jersey IED attacks. The trend suggests that, despite the proliferation of online materials regarding IED construction, many would-be terrorists rely on real-world training in order to successfully carry out an IED attack. .

Source of the Threat

Based on current activity levels and targeting trends, terrorism associated with Islamist-extremist organisations such as Al-Qaeda and IS currently poses the greatest threat to European and North American passenger rail networks. Whilst in recent years there has been an increase in terrorist activity associated with the far-right, at present many of these emerging groups lack the operational capability of established terrorist networks such as IS. Moreover, the majority of far-right plots and attacks in recent years have focused on ethnic, sexual or religious minorities, or political opponents.

At present, there are few indicators to suggest that such groups are likely to attempt to carry out mass casualty terrorist attacks on passenger rail networks in the immediate future. A number of anarchist and far-left militant groups across Europe and North America have demonstrated some interest in acts of vandalism and sabotage against rail networks in association with a broad range of political causes. This includes the US-based ‘Pudget Sound Anarchists’, who have shared videos online promoting industrial sabotage of rail networks in opposition to fracking. However, there is very little evidence at present to suggest that such groups possess a rising capacity and/or willingness to target rail commuters with lethal intent.

The highest volume of terrorist activity directed against the UK rail transport network in recent decades originated from the IRA. Between 1991 and 1997, there were a reported 41 IRA attacks on transport targets across England. These attacks featured a total of 81 separate IEDs and resulted in three deaths. During this period, there were also more than 6,500 telephoned bomb threats and a further 9,400 suspicious objects reported across the rail network. Whilst the IRA’s intention was not to carry out mass casualty attacks, the sheer volume of activity, in addition to the added challenges posed by copycats and malicious pranksters, placed significant financial pressure on UK transport networks and the resources of police and rail security services.

Rail Security Enhancements

Following the peak of the IRA campaign against the UK mainland, review of existing rail security weaknesses led to the implementation of a broader security strategy to target-harden the UK rail network and reduce the risks facing it. Security measures introduced in the intervening period include:

Installation of CCTV systems across the rail network to assist in counter-terrorism investigations and provide security personnel and stationmasters with greater visibility of the facilities.

Improved lighting to deter terrorists and improve site visibility.

Repairing gaps in perimeter fencing along the rail network to limit access to unauthorised persons.

Installation of transparent or blast-resistant bins to limit the effectiveness of IEDs placed inside them.

Encouraging staff and passengers to identify and report suspicious behaviour and unattended packages.

Future Trends

The terrorist threat to passenger rail networks is highly likely to persist for the foreseeable future. Despite the destruction of the IS ‘Caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria, the group continues to pose a major threat to the West in the form of a decentralised network.

Associated risks are likely to emerge from the return of foreign fighters previously aligned with jihadi terrorist groups in current conflict theatres. Such persons could potentially play a leading role in the formation of extremist hubs and the diffusion of terrorist skills and operational tradecraft throughout support groups in the West. In the face of these and other threats, the need for innovative, intelligence-led security solutions to the heightened threat has never been greater. By identifying and analysing trends from previous terrorist attacks, we increase our odds of stopping the next one.

Gareth Herbert

Intelligence Analyst, VSG www.vsg.co.uk

…………………………………………………………

If you see something suspicious: move away and call 999 or the police Anti-Terrorist Hotline on 0800 789 321.

Or, while travelling on the rail network, text 61016 or call 0800 40 50 40 to contact British Transport Police.

The post Security Threat Analysis: Passenger Rail Networks appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Threats to both personal and national security have never been greater. For the most part we travel freely across public space, but – some say – for the high price of intrusive surveillance. So, is that price worth paying?

Safety and security are an integral part of modern life, and nowhere more important than in travel and transport and public spaces. Public transport networks and hubs are key for two reasons –  they are targets, and they are the means of entry and exit for perpetrators of crime. As a result, we have become subject to heavy levels of surveillance, sometimes at great inconvenience in everyday life.

Security versus privacy

Public space surveillance camera systems have an essential role to play in keeping people safe. As a society, we have come to accept their presence. Roads, railways, bus stations, trams, tubes, ports and airports are all covered by an array of security and surveillance measures, each designed to discourage and prevent anti-social behaviour, theft and violent attacks.

The deployment of armed police officers at railway stations and in public space, unthinkable in the UK until a few years ago, and detection dogs are a more common sight.   And security isn’t the sole domain of public sector services. The private sector plays an ever-growing part. Whether private or public sector providers, how do we know surveillance is measured and data management secure?

Surveillance camera technologies are at the forefront of the watching and gathering information aspects of security. The increased functionality of video analytic technology, ANPR (automatic number plate recognition) and facial recognition makes cameras an increasingly valuable tool. Improving image resolution, data capture and retrieval has made it a vital piece of protecting the travelling public, whilst ANPR has been integrated into cameras monitoring the road infrastructure.

Three years ago a survey by the British Security Industry Association concluded there were six million surveillance cameras operating in the UK. The increasing numbers of drones and body-worn cameras since then have likely doubled that number. Although proven to be excellent deterrents and means of data gathering, widening use means the scrutiny of personal data protection and personal privacy is all the more important. Maintaining a balance between the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens on the one hand and safeguarding the community on the other is at the heart of the Security Camera Commissioner’s (SCCs) strategy.

The SCC’s code of practice, a scheme against which organisations managing surveillance cameras in public spaces can benchmark themselves and be assessed, is designed to protect that balance. Its aim is to raise standards by enabling surveillance providers to benchmark themselves, encourage continual improvement strategies and ensure surveillance processes are robust and fit for purpose. This helps deliver public confidence in the presence, operation, purpose, and command and control of surveillance, whether by public or private sector organisations.

Ensuring competence

The range of security measures for travel and transport extend beyond surveillance.  Increasingly, baggage search and screening technologies, familiar to air travellers, are being used to protect other environments. Vehicle tracking, automated gates and barriers, manned guarding and detector dogs too are becoming commonplace.

All of these services, as well as the design, installation, maintenance and monitoring of video surveillance systems, are increasingly being undertaken by third-party contractors, whilst working to the highest recognised standards of security and integrity is of the utmost importance. The latest NSI code of practice (NCP104), which is based on established standards and best practice, offers a structured approach where the design and installation of the video surveillance system is undertaken with the full engagement of client and users to ensure all specific needs are met.

Working to the appropriate standards, as tested within a corporate management framework, i.e. encompassing the integrity of directors, how the business itself is managed, including quality management, environment and health and safety, is the most stringent test of competence.

Ongoing verification of compliance through independent and effective auditing and assessment means service providers can signal their continuing commitment to maintaining integrity, developing technical capability and service delivery.

Together raising standards

Through UKAS-accredited independent third- party certification bodies, contractors demonstrate commitment to best practice set by industry experts in British Standards and industry codes of practice, and recognised public authorities, such as the Security Camera Commissioner and the Security Industry Authority.

Companies who seek to benchmark themselves against those codes and NSI approval schemes demonstrate commitment to the highest standards of competence in the delivery of CCTV, monitoring and security services.

These powerful examples of the public-private partnership in action result in surveillance methods keeping us all safer, and within a good governance framework signified by adherence to standards, are a price worth paying to exercise freedoms we hold dear.

Richard Jenkins

Chief Executive, National Security Inspectorate

www.nsi.org.uk

The post Surveillance on public transport networks: too intrusive? appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Recent events in Brussels, Paris, Germany, Egypt, and even in the United States have highlighted the growing urgent operational requirements to screen people for concealed threats to life.

Since then, there have been calls to introduce additional security checks in mass transit locations and to introduce security screening.

The challenges for securing mass transit

It’s certainly true that the increased threat and revised methods being deployed by terrorists call for security protocols to be revisited. However, simply adding more of the same security checks, or displacing the existing security perimeter, won’t make people safer. Traditional security methods cause crowds to gather and, regardless of whether this is inside or outside the terminal, this is exactly the area that terrorists are attracted to. Our actions bring no benefit if we are simply relocating the threat.

Security technology needs to be visually unobtrusive in crowded areas such as mass transit environments – ideally it should be completely ‘invisible’ to the public. Therefore, screening must not present any barrier that restricts the free flow of people in public areas, as creating further congestion has the potential to offer terrorists greater opportunity to attack without detection.

Evolving threats and responses for securing mass transit

Securing mass transit should be the last line of defence against terrorist attacks. However, it is becoming more of a requirement due to the increase in ‘lone actor’ attacks, which the intelligence agencies and police find more challenging to prevent.

It is a troubling fact that if the new solutions and technologies that are available today had been properly utilised, it would probably have been possible to detect some of the terrorist activities we have seen in the past year, or at least would have provided early warning of potential situations.

In the current climate of international terrorism, there is a rapidly growing requirement to screen people over a much broader range of locations and security scenarios. In fact, the need to screen people for such items has never been greater. It has become crucial to public safety to screen individuals, covertly and at the earliest opportunity, at a mass transit environment’s perimeter entry points, which also must be achieved without impacting the flow rates of people or introducing so-called security screening ‘bottlenecks’.

Airport security operators utilise passive stand-off screening as it has the ability to discreetly screen all individuals in real time as they pass through perimeter entrances of the airport concourse. The real-time screening capability is particularly important, as it enables threat detection and isolation as soon as a threat passes through the perimeter. This also avoids pushing the build-up of queues from the landside and airside checkpoints to the perimeter entrances of the airport concourse, reducing the security risk associated with ‘bottlenecks’. This new technology is very different to the first generation static ‘body scanning’ scenario that many people identify with landside and airside security checkpoints.

The use of passive technology is also vitally important, as screening potentially hundreds of people as they go about their daily lives using traditional airport style, or active, scanners is associated with health concerns, due to the radioactive element of the scanning process.

Enhanced communications

Using state-of-the-art surveillance techniques enhances communications to those on the ground dealing with potential situations. The ability to view live video which is being streamed from CCTV or body worn cameras grants the control room a full awareness of situations as they unfold. Traditionally, CCTV is only used after an event has taken place, but having the ability to stream video, in real time, to mobile devices and control rooms means that appropriate responses can be managed more effectively, in less time.

As well as this, sending facial recognition and passive screening outputs, or CCTV cameras, to the mobile devices being used by security officers on the ground can aid the tracking of a potential suspect, and allows for remedial action to be undertaken when required.

First responder training and increased patrols

The growth of threats to mass transit environments has spurred on the development of new ways of working, as well as new technologies. Mass transit locations are typically identified as ‘softer’ targets, so would not normally have anti-terrorism patrol teams. However, due to heightened threat levels, the use of new technologies is best utilised when working in partnership with increased numbers of patrols, who can take corrective action if need be. First responders also need additional training so that they are prepared should the worst happen.

Public education campaigns

Combined with these new technologies and new ways of working, the public is a great source of threat intelligence. Increasing the public’s level of threat awareness, as well as educating them on what they should do if a threat takes place, and giving them channels which they can use to alert the emergency services to incidents or suspicious activities, will all help to prevent these situations from occurring.

Ensuring safer mass transit with greater levels of protection

Greater intelligence, combined with a greater situational awareness of live events using technologies such as live video, passive screening and video analytics, would mean that mass transit could be secured without too much impact on people’s daily lives.

Marie Clutterbuck

Marketing Director, Digital Barriers

digitalbarriers.com

The post The problems with securing mass transit in 2016 appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Events in the last twelve months have demonstrated to dramatic effect that terrorists are increasingly selecting soft targets to commit their atrocities. The reality is that these locations, which include hotels, holiday resorts and tourist areas, are hard to secure.

Hotel security management – the risks

Terrorists and other criminals exploit any weakness, with lone or small team attacks using well-planned tactics and weapons. Add to this the extensive media coverage that successful perpetrators receive, as well as the devastating effects on the country’s economy and a high-profile governmental response, and they make an even more attractive target.

Developing hotel security management

As a result, hotels are developing and improving systems for assessing risk and implementing security. It has always been a trade-off between what is needed and the cost of implementation. However, over the last decade, understanding has grown of why investing in this area is not only beneficial but can lead to more custom and profitability. The hospitality and corporate industry realises that doing nothing can be costlier than investing in security.

As travellers become more aware of potential risks, it is encouraging to see some hotels and resorts have responded to possible threats to their business, staff and guests by bringing in outside experts to test and advise on security shortfalls within their estates.

The main challenge, of course, is that hotels are public places: it is almost impossible to check every piece of luggage coming in and out. Coupled with this, hotel management does not want the hotel to look like a high-security prison. However, that said, as with many areas in life, “you get what you pay for”. In my view, 4 and 5-star hotels tend to have a better security and safety culture and invest more in this area. A number of chains realise the key to good hotel security is to have better trained staff who are security aware. Over the last few years, high-end hotels and resorts have prioritised this area and have commissioned me or others in my field to review, write and deliver hotel security awareness programs aimed at staff at all levels, as well as reviewing and practising response plans.

Hotel security management – staff vetting

A recurrent area of risk requiring attention is the staff vetting process. Hotels in general tend to rely on large numbers of agency staff to support the hotel functions.

This is a weak point within the hotel security process since some agencies do not vet or train their staff to the same standards as the hotel would itself. Furthermore, some hotels ignore the vetting and checks on staff being supplied. Although all hotels use agency staff at some point, the high-end hotels tend to have a better control and monitoring process for this.

Having the right security manager in place and having a clearly understood and implemented security policy is critical for a hotel group. For example, if a hotel manager wants to override a security manager’s decision or budget, this decision must go through an approval process from the hotel’s head office, so everybody is aware of the risks and mitigation that is required. Having a health and security culture at a hotel is critical and needs to be driven down from the top:

Hotel Security Management and Health and Safety

It is also clear that the corporate world must take more steps to protect its staff when they are out on the road. Of course, some organisations do this very effectively and have a comprehensive security and travel programme, but this is not yet true for them all.

As more atrocities take place against travellers, hotels and resorts with the resulting media coverage, the increasing pressure placed on governments and hotel companies will ensure that hotels continue to improve on overall safety and security.

Tips for Travelling Safely

Due to the nature of hospitality and hotels in general, there is no guarantee to safety. Below is a check list when travelling and staying in hotels and resorts:

• Where possible, choose a safe country/ region to stay. You can check the latest government travel advice for the destination country and region. See www.gov.uk/foreign-travel-advice
• If you can, choose a credible and well known hotel company with a central security and crisis team, as well as a localised department.

Check with the hotel / resort to see if they have:

• A dedicated security / safety department.
• A safety programme and if they can answer some basic safety questions (remember any security procedures and planning of worth will not be shared in their entirety for security reasons; this is a good thing and not a negative).

A personal view on choosing a hotel in a hostile environment

Although prominent hotels are likely to have a security department and robust risk planning, some international business travellers to hostile environments are choosing more modest hotels. The view is that a less prestigious hotel, possibly outside the city centre or at a distance from well-known and popular locations, will have fewer high-profile guests and western tourists, thereby making it a less attractive target.

Of course, this needs to be part of a full risk assessment and there is no fool-proof way of guaranteeing safety, but perhaps opting for a low profile hotel in high risk areas is a tactic worth considering while the threat remains high.

Darren Leigh MSyl

Managing Director, Twelve Nine Ltd.

A Specialist Security and Risk Consultant.

The post Hotel security management appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Stories of anti-social, threatening behaviour, robbery, theft, pickpocketing, assault and drunken passengers on mass transit systems frequently appear in the media.

These stories mirror reports of anxiety experienced by people going to and from particular stops or stations. Fear of crime could cripple the system, with widespread diffusion of “crime signals” giving potential passengers considerable concerns about personal security.

Such issues are generally recognised as major barriers to public transport use, especially at night. This is particularly pertinent with the new 24/7 Night Tube (https://tfl.gov.uk/campaign/tube-improvements/what- we-are-doing/night-tube) recently introduced in central London.  Fear of violence can be as powerful in undermining perceptions of safety, reducing passenger numbers and hence increasing general risks, thus creating an active cycle of fear.

Research evidence becomes crucial within this framework if we want to understand not only the scope of the problem but also consider ways to reduce the incidence of crimes and fear of crime on public transport systems. When do crimes take place? Where? Are there clear concentrations or patterns, and can these be used to predict “hotspots” of problems?  There has been a massive increase in successful crime reduction programmes “on the streets” (www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/07418825.2012.673632) but there is in fact a dearth of evidence on “what works” in public transport systems.

A University of Cambridge descriptive analysis of over five years (1st April 2008 to 31st September 2013) of Transport for London Bus Driver Incident Report data on bus routes with high calls for service volume in London reveals clear and predicable patterns of on-bus crimes. The analysis shows high-crime bus routes, with incredible consistency both spatially as well as temporarily. More importantly, these stable places are very small: precise segments of bus routes, between bus stops, remain hot, across days, hours, and months.

We analysed relevant Transport for London (TfL) incident data

One of the most striking findings is that the bus system is quite a safe place, relative to other public facilities, in terms of both volume as well as harm. These incident records show that the majority of events are in fact related to disturbance rather than “against person” crimes (49.2%), and more than a third are about ticket fraud and forgery. Only 3.7% involved Violence against the Person and 0.5% robberies. These disturbances can be quite serious and can impact the quality of life of people who simply want to get home. More should be done to reduce these problems. However, they do not scale the same as the severity linked to physical assaults, robberies and homicide.

The results

Still, the data examination confirms that these all of these incidents cluster on specific high- crime bus routes and high-crime bus route segments and certain transport environments – which makes these places susceptible for preventative measures. We defined a “bus segment” as a portion of the entire bus route, between two bus stops. You could imagine there are thousands of these bus segments across Greater London. We wanted to identify these “small worlds”, because if you could predict where (and when) these “hot bus-route segments” exist, it is more likely that you would be able to prevent them through various interventions.

Exploratory analysis showed that only 5% (32) of bus routes were responsible for 25% of incidents (2,786). 18% of bus routes were responsible for 50% of incidents. But when we broke down the bus routes into the bus segments, we found even greater concentrations.

Spatial analysis showed 7% of these segments (110) are responsible for more than 40% of incidents on buses. Relatively few segments had a disproportionate number of events on them, but even fewer bus segments had particularly high volume of crime and disorder. The implications for control measures are profound.

Furthermore, we found evidence for temporal concentrations as well. Analysis showed that “hot bus routes”’ had higher volumes at night – six hours (00:00-05:59) are responsible for more than 37% of on-bus incidents. The remaining bus routes had higher volumes in the late afternoon/early evening rush-hour period – six hours (15:00-20:59) accounts for over 39% of on-bus incidents per day. Interestingly, during the morning peak hours there is very little crime on the buses, despite having the same “crime opportunities” – which can easily be explained: offenders and young troublemakers are still in bed.

These identified spatial and temporal patterns of incidents on London’s bus routes can help the police and the transport agencies to target specific routes and time slots. By doing so, these agencies would join the evidence-based policing movement, which seeks the best research to guide policy. In fact, TfL has already conducted a randomised controlled trial on the back of our analysis, which helps in revisiting prevention policies. Therefore, data analysis provides useful insights for preventing crime and disorder on public transport for the safety of people.

Ms Sultan Kus

Graduate of the University of Cambridge with a Master’s degree in Criminology

Dr Barak Ariel

Lecturer in the Institute of Criminology, University of Cambridge and Hebrew University

The post Analysing incident data to prevent transport crime appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Professor Chris Hankin is Director of the Institute for Security Science and Technology and Professor of Computing Science at Imperial College, London. In this interview Transport Security Expo and City Security magazine asked him a few questions.

Tell us a little about the organisation you work for, and your role there

The Institute for Security Science and Technology at Imperial College, of which I am Director, allows me to act as an interface between the research into science and technology being carried out at Imperial College and the security sector stakeholders who are interested in our work. Part of our work is to identify science and technology that may have been developed for non-security challenges but which have security applications.  For example, we work with Materials Scientists who have developed new techniques for spotting substances dissolved in liquids and advances in scanning devices at border controls. My team also has close links with the Centre for Transport Studies – a joint initiative between University College and Imperial College that was established to look at issues around transport scheduling and, more recently, the future security implications of autonomous, or driverless vehicles.

What are you focusing on in the transport sector in particular?

As well as running ISST, I direct the Research Institute in Trustworthy Industrial Control Systems – a consortium of five universities brought together to examine current and future cyber threats to control systems. Part of this group’s brief is to explore issues within critical national infrastructure. It has a wide-ranging remit, working with the rail safety and standards board, for example, while also focusing on areas like communication of risk.

So much is happening involving security and the mass movement of people, especially at borders. What security issues in this area are your team concentrating on right now?

We have been looking at border security in the context of airport security, in partnership with some of the sector’s key players. Our focus is on ways to keep tabs on people as they move around an airport, from the check in desk to the departure gate. We want to keep them safe at every step and make sure everything runs as smoothly as it possibly can by helping people to not lose luggage, for example, or preventing unnecessary delays at security check points.

Another area of interest is train control in and around Europe. Within the Research Institute our partners have been investigating the new European standard for this. The work has cyber security implications and raises issues about the best way to facilitate communications between the control centre, the trackside and the trains themselves. It’s a fascinating and fast-evolving area.

How about developments in scanning and detecting?

Something that we’re involved in with our colleagues from the Materials department is how to scan and automatically detect chemical composition of liquids without having to physically sample them. Similarly, there is interest in developing techniques to scan and assess parcels moving through airports, freight terminals and container ports. Teams at Imperial are exploring new ways to scan items and identify their contents without having to open them up.

What transport security issues can you see coming up in the future that we need to be aware of now?

A lot of focus is being placed on the ongoing rise of the internet and its dominance across the world. Predictions of 50 billion devices connecting to the internet by the year 2020 really aren’t far-fetched. We need to be ready to face the increased risk of cyber security attacks that will inevitably follow this deluge of internet use.

One area that will be enabled by the “Internet-of-Things” is that of autonomous vehicles. Again, a revolution is being predicted by some that will see vehicles become more and more intelligent. This is happening already, with experiments on driverless car technology and so forth. Computers already installed in some of the higher-end cars on the market can make very sophisticated calculations around fuel efficiency and safety measures.

As this approach becomes more and more prevalent, more functions of the vehicle could be given over to autonomous control. This is, however, an area that leaves us wide open to risk. In an emergency, for instance, the car’s computer could make the decision whether to crash into the vehicle in front, or to swerve onto the pavement. Do we really want that level of autonomy?  What if the car’s computer was hacked or tampered with as part of a cyber attack? It’s a very exciting area of development, but one for which we must take great care to monitor the security protocols.

Professor Chris Hankin sits on the Advisory Board of Transport Security Expo 2015.

The post Professor Chris Hankin: the future of transport security appeared first on City Security Magazine.

A need for border control?

The recent tragedy in Paris has triggered inevitable questions about border control. At the time of writing it is yet to be confirmed whether or not those who carried out the attacks are European citizens, or if they have indeed used mass migration as a way to move unnoticed across Europe to conduct their attacks, although at least one of the attackers is believed to have entered Europe through Greece posing as a refugee from Syria.

It is perhaps understandable that some sectors of society are looking at the migration issue with new levels of discomfort. Those who are already uncomfortable have typically hung their concerns on issues such as the strain on infrastructure presented by thousands of newcomers. However, the attacks in the French capital have raised serious question marks about the potential threat that may be moving within the migrant movement, many of whom, it must be remembered, are actually trying to escape the very same terrorism in their home lands.

Border control needs support

Looking at the migration issue in isolation, the level of migration is such that it will very soon become too great for border controls to effectively handle. When you factor in the inevitable tightening of security that is already occurring following the Paris attacks, it becomes obvious that border control needs help. So the onus must now be on thinking of the most cost-effective and efficient ways to support border agencies.

The role of deterrent in this situation should never be underestimated. Indeed, the current political discourse focusses largely on deterring people from attempting to cross the French/UK border. But migrants understand only too well that their main challenge is the few short miles either side of the Channel where border control still holds ground. As they approach Calais they are relatively unhindered and indeed undeterred, and once through border control in Kent they can return to being relatively free to travel around the UK.

We should also not ignore the obvious demographic of migrants at Calais. Few people could have failed to notice the majority are young, fit and healthy males. But who are these people? Are they truly trying to escape from persecution, or are they simply economic opportunists, or worse? Whatever their real status, they are agile and can be difficult to detect.

A central part of an effective strategy must surely be to extend the footprint of that ‘challenge’ area to further deter people and to detect those who manage to make it through. Think of it as a two-stage approach where there is the central ring of steel controlled by border control, and around that a second, wider ring of deterrent and detection.

Here in the UK the police have their own problems to contend with as numbers are cut. Diverting police to conduct migrant patrols takes the already under-stress police away from their other pressing tasks, such as ensuring public safety in the wake of a major terrorist attack. It is also unrealistic to draft in the military, although prior to the Paris attacks the Mayor of Calais, Natacha Bouchart, called for the French army to be deployed, and there have been similar calls here in the UK.

Role of private security in border control

Private security has a role to play here. By contracting private security to police a wider area outside of the small area that is the responsibility of border control, the UK government would benefit from highly capable expertise and experience, and could ramp up or reduce activity to suit. The alternative of the government increasing border control would inevitably result in politically uncomfortable redundancies and cutbacks if and when the current migrant crisis eases. Employing private security offers a low risk, but highly effective solution that is scalable.

Private security is well equipped to deliver in this role. As well as highly effective and well trained patrol dog teams, there are also specialist sniffer dog teams that can be utilised to search for everything from stowaways to drugs. Retired police dog instructors with vast experience in all aspects of police dog work have been employed by some private security companies, and fully understand the specific challenges faced.

Private security patrol dogs are used for many assignments, from guarding critical infrastructure to parks and open spaces, and provide a highly visible and effective deterrent. General purpose patrol dog units have been known to achieve more arrests than any other divisions.

This second tier approach could see private security employed at a great many locations, such as motorway service stations, lorry parks and anywhere else where migrants who have entered the country illegally might be found still in hiding. The service can be highly mobile and fluid to allow deployment as and where needed. As private security companies are also widely used by the commercial world, there would also be an added benefit of intelligence gained through those contracts. So, for example, if private security at an industrial estate became aware of migrants unloading, this information can be fed back into the mix and the company would be empowered to deal with it immediately.

Here in the UK private security is already experienced at working in partnership with police, and is certainly as well equipped from a technology and communications perspective. In the role of secondary deterrent and detection, private security has a lot to offer in helping relieve the growing stress on border control, and indeed policing, at this most sensitive time.

David Ward, Msyl, Managing Director

Ward Security

www.ward-security.co.uk

The post Border control: the role of private security appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Technological developments in the private security industry are helping to protect the UK’s transport networks and maintain passenger confidence in travel safety.

Recent terrorist attacks on transport networks around the world have served to illustrate the vulnerability of the transport sector. Indeed, transport networks are often the intended target for terrorist attacks due to their open accessibility which provides terrorists with the opportunity to cause maximum damage and disruption.

The vulnerability of transport networks has been illustrated numerous times over the past decade, perhaps the most notable being the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 (9/11) and 7 July 2005 (7/7).

More recent events, such as the attack on a French train in August 2015, in which a gunman was overpowered by three civilians, have further served as a ‘wake-up call’ for many transport operators and authorities, who are increasingly turning to emerging technology and improved procedures to provide an added level of security on transport networks.

An increasing reliability on technology

It’s fair to say that the security landscape has dramatically changed since the attacks of 9/11 and 7/7. The adoption of new technologies has greatly improved onboard security both in the air, and on the ground.

Many aircraft and passenger carrying vehicles now carry onboard CCTV technology, which consists of covert and/or overt CCTV cameras, connected to a Digital Video Recorder (DVR). CCTV technology played a significant role in bringing those responsible for the attacks of 7/7 to justice. In 2013, MPs were told that the police and security services had prevented as many as 34 terrorist incidents since the 7/7 attacks, including at least one or two per year that would have resulted in mass casualties. CCTV evidence gathered from failed terror attacks since 9/11 has been instrumental in the investigation of terrorist activity and has helped lead to 2,877 arrests for terror offences. One such example comes from the failed attempt of 21/7 – just two weeks after the 7/7 incident. Nearly 28,000 CCTV recordings gathered by police helped lead to the convictions of four men, who were ultimately found guilty of conspiracy to murder. The footage was condensed into seven hours’ worth of recordings from buses, trains and stations, which was then used as evidence in court.

Thanks to increasingly more advanced CCTV technology, the application of CCTV solutions to combat terrorism is becoming ever more useful. One key area where CCTV is rapidly developing is that of video analytics. This impressive technology is invaluable in protecting heavily populated areas from the risk of terrorist attacks.

One particularly useful application of video analytics in terms of combatting terrorism on the UK’s transport networks is ‘object left/object removed’. ‘Object left’ refers to the identification of an unattended item such as a bag or package – potentially containing an explosive device. Often, making the assumption that an unattended package is malicious can cause panic and lead to a chaotic situation. It is therefore crucial for security professionals to make the assertion as to whether there is an innocent explanation or if the item is indeed malicious and requiring an immediate evacuation. ‘Object removed’ allows CCTV operators to be notified regarding the offending object, allowing for its removal and the restoration of public order.

High Definition (HD) CCTV is also expanding across a wide range of video surveillance applications. “HD CCTV signifies an unprecedented revolution in the quality of images that can be delivered, the ability to more easily identify suspects and make sense of their actions, and the potential to improve the successful conviction rate on the ground,” says Simon Adcock, Chairman of the BSIA’s CCTV section.

Other technologies have an important role to play in protecting the nation’s transport network, such as the use of access control to prevent unauthorised access to sensitive areas of the network.

Looking ahead

Increasing numbers of ‘home-grown’ terrorists and a recent influx of migrants from politically unstable countries suggests that the transport security landscape is set to change and evolve further over the next few years.

The private security sector will undoubtedly continue to play an important role in protecting the staff, passengers and cargo on the UK’s transport network. With ever more innovative technology entering the UK’s private security market, it’s clear that UK private security companies will be able to provide world leading security solutions to reduce the threat of terrorism against the UK’s transport system.

The BSIA has published guidance on security in the transport sector, which can be found on the BSIA’s website together with a list of reputable security suppliers with a wealth of experience in protecting transport systems.

James Kelly

Chief Executive, British Security Industry Association

www.bsia.co.uk

The post Transport networks security: passenger safety appeared first on City Security Magazine.