As concerns grow around the potential security threats drones may pose to both civilian and security entities, the market for counter-drone technology is rapidly maturing. In this article, we help you cut through the hype that exists around this technology.

Drones and a £4.6bn security saving opportunity

Counter-drone technology, also known as counter-UAS (Unmanned Aerial System), C-UAS, or counter-UAV (Unmanned Aerial Vehicle) technology, refers to systems that are used to detect and/or intercept unmanned aircraft.

A lot has been made of the alleged Gatwick incident of 2018, the criminal exploitation around smuggling contraband into prisons and near misses between drones and manned aircraft. All of these showcase the challenges around the use of drones and the technologies used to detect them.

There is no silver bullet for any one individual detection method. However, the recent PWC Skies without Limits v2.0 report highlighted the positive opportunities in a £45bn contribution to the UK economy and cost savings of £4.6bn in defence and security related sectors alone.  In a market survey conducted in 2015, there were just 10 dedicated counter-drone systems available for acquisition. There are now over 500 systems on the market, the end result being a myriad of companies now offering C-UAS products in a $6bn market.

This presents dual, potentially conflicting, decisions for those responsible for security: to spend money on C-UAS systems because of the potential challenges drones present and/or embrace the pro-security aspects of drone technology.

Regulations and Protocol

Counter-drone technology offers capabilities in four main areas:

• Detect
• Track
• Identify
• Effect (incapacitate)

The majority of C-UAS market solutions concentrate on the Detecting and Tracking – which, for the security industry, is most important.

Technologies for drone identification systems

The following technologies are used in drone identification systems:

• Electro-Optical (EO) – uses a visual signature
• Acoustic – due to noise attenuation has a limited range
• Infrared (IR) or Thermal – uses a heat signature
• Radar – accurate but expensive
• RF (Radio-Frequency) – locates characteristic signals broadcast by most drones, such as 2.4 and 5.8GHz

These technologies are compared in the table below.

Any means of disabling a drone whilst in the sky is not permitted in the UK via the Air Navigation Order, except for limited police powers which can be obtained through Military Assistance to the Civilian Authorities (MACA).

For Critical National Infrastructure (CNI) sites, some suppliers have been evaluated by the CPNI – though no standards exist for Effectors (C-UAS that incapacitate drones).  Coordination of C-UAS at a national level is done via the Joint Security and Resilience Centre (JSaRC).

Procuring C-UAS

Crucially, it’s understanding the customer need – simply saying I want to ensure you defend my property against all drones just isn’t possible, for any site in the UK.

Broadly speaking, when procuring a counter- drone system, it’s essential to evaluate  these aspects of the proposed system:

• Range
• Price
• Resilience if attacked with a single source
• Installation setup
• Customer support
• Effectiveness

In a 2019 study of over 500 C-UAS systems, not a single C-UAS manufacturer would provide details about their product’s performance in real-world use. This information vacuum makes it difficult for would-be C-UAS owners to know what actually works and what doesn’t, anticipate potential issues, or select a system that is best suited to their needs.

An effective intelligence system will be of far more use than physically dealing with a drone itself.

Defending against drones isn’t cheap

In a 2019 study, out of 123 C-UAS products for which pricing information was available, 77 cost more than £100,000.

A study that looked at equipping Germany’s 16 busiest airports with drone detection systems would cost upwards of half a billion euros. Personnel training, maintenance, and staff time to operate the counter-drone system all incur significant additional costs.

As drones proliferate, related industrial secrets become just as vital to protect. This was recently evidenced by USA and UK security services in government news about alleged Russian and Chinese engagement and how some Commercial Off the Shelf (COTS) systems have been exploited in the current Ukrainian conflict.

The duality of drones and security protection

Multiple drone solutions can enable businesses and their market position. PWC Skies without Limits v2.0 (July 2022) references four categories of technology that could realise a £45bn industry:

• Unmanned Traffic Management (UTM)
• Detect and Avoid (DAA)
• Autonomy
• Infrastructure (digital and physical)

Two examples include automated patrols from drone-in-a-box solutions or persistent surveillance on coastal waters.

Detect and Avoid

C-UAS is essential for DAA and infrastructure –  the flow chart below illustrates the different aspects on both cooperative and non-cooperative technologies from a regulatory perspective. The solutions needed for cooperative and non-cooperative technologies could be the same.

Manned aviation for years has relied on ground-based radar to safely separate aircraft, and C-UAS solutions have an opportunity to do the same for drones.

A linear asset could deploy a suite of mobile C-UAS units to secure a corridor where drones are operating BVLOS (Beyond Visual Line of Sight), and longer term they could be part of the national infrastructure the UK so badly needs to permit BVLOS operations, if done at the right price point to enable this.

Summary

Counter-UAS is naturally something that will be included when developing your security strategy. But organisations must also consider the active use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) as a crucial way to enable the development of regulatory safety cases for other areas of security. Not only can UAS detect and ensure the skies above are clear, but they can help to make a much more robust business proposal for expanding the scope of your operation to BVLOS and automation.

Aleks Kowalski

Business Development Director

LiveLink Aeorospace   www.livelinkaerospace.com

Read our previous articles on drones

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A Drone (UAV) Security Team can provide greater situational awareness and deliver a superior level of holistic service at a fraction of the cost of a traditional amalgamation of CCTV, guarding presence and mobile response.

High risk environments or areas previously inaccessible to foot or mobile patrols can be included as routine patrols within the security plan, therefore significantly improving the security posture of a facility, site or estate. But how do you select an effective drone security provider?

There are a number of crucial aspects to consider. When looking to procure a drone security provider, be sure to ask them about the following aspects of their service:

• Experience of operating in similar environments to yours
• Capability to plan operations effectively
• Know-how to select the right equipment
• Proficiency to hold required licences, accreditations and insurance

Each of these areas is explained in more detail below.

Does the drone security service provider have the right experience?

Operating a drone within a security function is only as beneficial as the operator’s experience in providing protective services. Safe flights, working knowledge and smooth control over an aircraft is, of course, important, but the operator’s ability and judgement to quickly identify and escalate potential threats in situ is equally as essential. These skills are derived from operating in environments whereby the theatre can quickly and drastically change; therefore, the operators are proactively engaged in identifying suspicious behaviour and recognising the warning signs prior to such.

Can the drone security service provider plan operations effectively?

Drone security operations should be meticulously planned to minimise disruption and maximise effect on the security plan as a whole.

Planning may require CAA or NATS consultations, Enhanced Non-Standard Flight (ENSF) permissions or NOTAMs (Notice to Airmen) to be dispensed. Every detail of an operation should be evidenced and produced prior to deployment, including extensive risk assessments for effects on the team, the client and third parties.

Infrastructure to support drone security operations is likely to include: a clearly identifiable contained cordon, a dedicated position within a control room, undisturbed power supply and lighting to the LZ (Landing/Take-off Zone), data connection/IP connections and encoding, radio communication tower/repeater, and ATV/support utility vehicles.

Can the drone security service provider select the appropriate equipment?

The Drone Security Team should consider the practicality and range of equipment required in order to accomplish the objectives set out in the Service Level Agreement (SLA). They should be equipped to provide a realistic and holistic approach to service delivery and continuity; this should be measured against KPIs. For example:

• If operating in open areas of mass crowd congregation and/or areas of increased RF fratricide, the use of tethered systems should also be reviewed and objectively considered.
• Display screens should be of high resolution and illumination if operating during daylight hours, particularly when sun glare is high.
• Crew welfare is of paramount importance. The operators should have sufficient shelter, shade, comfort, provisions and a remote work station to operate from. Every consideration into this should be offered, e.g. utilising white light at night then proceeding outside into the darkness will temporarily restrict/blind a drone operator and observer’s vision, therefore delay/suspend operations and/or increase the likelihood of an accident due to pilot error.

• In terms of uniforms and PPE, service providers may wish to maintain their corporate brand awareness; however, it should still be considerate and practical. The potential risk of head and eye injuries form operating drones is significantly increased within the cordon area, primarily during take-off and landing stages. All mandatory PPE requirements must be adhered to.

Check your drone security service provider’s documentation

There are a number of licences, accreditations and insurances that drone security service provider should hold. Ask your potential providers about the following:

• The operator should hold a Permission for Commercial Operations (PfCO) issued by the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA). This will identify what permissions the operator must abide by.
• The operator should hold a SIA CCTV licence. A public space CCTV licence is required when either a fixed or PTZ system is used to actively monitor or track members of the public (on private and public land) to guard premises against disorder or to protect individuals from assault.
• It is recommended that the Drone Security Team be SIA-licensed to enable them to actively engage in security related incidents, if required. The nature of the task will determine what category of SIA licence is needed.
• It is best practice that where individuals are employed in an environment where the security and safety of people, goods or property is required, or where such security screening is in the public interest, then they should be vetted to BS7858.
• The operator should be registered with the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO), conduct a comprehensive privacy impact assessment (justification for the use of a drone), make a concerted effort to inform and advise the public, and minimise collateral intrusion, as generally, drones are considered as highly privacy intrusive (the likelihood of recording individuals inadvertently is high).
• The operator should be fully insured for their scope of work. The nature of the task will determine the level of insurance cover required.
• The operator should ideally hold ISO9001 and a H&S accreditation such as CHAS to demonstrate professional standards are adhered to.

Derek Robinson, Operations Manager

www.airvis.co.uk

See also:

Other articles in the Drones category in Security Technology

Counter the threat from drones to business

Drones: a threat to nuclear power stations?

The post Selecting a Drone Security Provider appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Once the stuff of sci-fi movies and futuristic dreams, drones are set to become a part of our daily lives. They are now widely available to purchase online and vary enormously from the inexpensive, pocket sized drone – controlled by a mobile phone and able to receive live video images – to the heavyweight octocopter drones which carry over 20kg.  And as the technology to build them becomes more sophisticated, so too does the capability to put them to use.

The online retail giant Amazon is an example of this advancement, with the development of a pioneering drone delivery service, Prime Air. This proposed drone delivery service is currently testing the capabilities of automatous drones with machines carrying a payload of up to 25kg for a range of 10 miles and lighter payloads reaching a maximum speed of 50mph.

Initially known to many for their military use, drones are used today to drop food packages to starving villagers whilst also providing a low-cost option to deploy and activate small arms and explosive devices.

Counter drone technology

But drones also pose a problem: some are fully capable of monitoring Wi-Fi and manipulating our phones and other technology, and in some cases, they are able to intercept mobile phones. Accounts of drones in aircraft near misses and contraband drops within the perimeter of prisons have become a regular occurrence.

Counter drone technology has been slow responding to this threat. A search on Google will throw up several “solutions”, including attack eagles specially trained in the Netherlands, laser jammers and air pressure guns which fire a large net into the path of the drone. Unfortunately, none can be relied upon against fast moving drone threat, nor can a drone differentiate between a legitimate delivery or, for example, one carrying medical supplies.

Specially designed targeted RF Jammers seem to be effective, but due to the re-classification of drones by the CAA – under the umbrella of aircraft – their use has been restricted by OFCOM.

Drones: threat to our privacy

The challenge is to develop a solution that counters these significant threats to our data, privacy and information and uses a very targeted RF approach that does not interfere with GSM, Wi-Fi or any other commercially used frequencies. This countermeasure needs to create an exclusion zone with a signal that denies the operator control, video and telemetry downlink capability: in effect, to create an electronic no fly zone over strategic areas such as government establishments, power stations, large public stadiums and airports etc.

Additionally, any such countermeasure would need to be deployed rapidly, so a lightweight, handheld, battery operated solution is crucial. In this way, you could create an invisible electronic shield impenetrable by commercial drones quickly and flexibly.

The good news is that specialist technology providers are taking up this challenge with some products in the final stages of research development and testing.

Whilst bringing multiple benefits, drones can be dangerous as well as compromising the security of our information and privacy. Fortunately, with a strategic approach to this threat supported by a technical countermeasures plan, there are solutions available to deter, intercept and divert malcontent.

Emma Shaw, Managing Director Esoteric Ltd.

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Yes, when used by responsible people. But established criminals and opportunists are exploiting a drone’s ability to bypass your perimeter security – you know, that little gap above your fence, where the birds hang out. Jeremy Fitton explores the risk from drones to business and developments in countering this threat.

Guard your air

A PwC research document claims that the world drone market will be worth $127 billion by 2020. Of that, 10% will be costs associated with security – bad drones. So, are drones really a threat to your security?

As a security professional you are repeatedly reviewing risks relating to the assets under your protection. The advent of drones has enabled your land-based troublemakers to fly. So, if you have any sort of perimeter, access control security, or air gap, be aware that a drone can simply fly over your fence or bridge your air gap. And how would you know? Are your CCTV cameras and your guards looking upwards?

The risk from drones

What is the likelihood of a drone causing you a problem, and what would be the negative financial impact of that?

The answers to these two questions depend upon the asset you are protecting, and its relative location and environment. If you are a prison in the UK, then the likelihood is a certainty (we read about it in the mainstream media) and the impact can be measured by the increased violence in the prison population due to a delivery of contraband. This then negatively impacts the staffing and medical budgets, hence a business case for investing in mitigation of the threat.

If you are a financial organisation, a drone could look through your boardroom windows to see who you are meeting with, and that knowledge in the wrong hands could directly impact your share price! The current likelihood of it happening is probably low but the impact could be high.

Categories of threat

As a drone security expert, I define the drone threat into five categories:

Recreational: people flying ignorantly, without intent to harm, but just getting in the way and disrupting your operations – think airports;

Activists: again, no aim to cause physical damage, just a desire to intentionally disrupt operations – think the flying of a protester flag at a televised sporting event;

Terror: drones on a one-way trip;

Smuggling: for example, into prisons, or ship to shore deliveries of contraband around seaports; and

Stealing: diamonds from the mine, smart phones from the warehouse, or any small item of high value.

The Smuggling and Stealing threats need two criminal collaborators: one at either end of the flight. They use the drone to connect themselves while bypassing your physical security  checkpoints, simply over the fence and unseen by your CCTV.

Links with cyber

But the threat doesn’t have to be a disposable payload on a hook; it can be Cyber. Most drones have an integrated high-resolution camera to record images. An additional small payload could be a cyber-attack device, a wi-fi sniffer, GPS spoofer or whatever corporate espionage device your competition wants to use to steal information from you. This is a privacy threat. The drone gets the assailant past your physical barriers, looking over your wall to monitor guard positions and movements. A drone could land on your roof with a cyber listening device and quietly sit there for a week, sniffing your data. And the device doesn’t even have to look like a drone, so how will your roof patrols spot the threat?

Perhaps that is a far-fetched thought, but how much is your data worth when in the wrong hands?

The terror threat is obviously intent to cause threat to life. Drones are easy to buy and relatively easy to fly, but they miss the human element that makes terror, terror. Activists aim for the news media.

Which leaves us with the most likely threat we face today. There are no official figures but drone security personnel we interviewed said it would be fair to assume that 95% of problem drones come from recreational fliers.

Before the common quadcopter drone, serious enthusiasts built and flew their expensive RC aircraft in a responsible manner, having to control every aspect of flight by their own hand.  But modern drones stabilise automatically by themselves. The pilot only gives RC commands to move the drone. That makes them more accessible to everyone, including the criminals, who are now realising they can distance themselves from the scene of the crime by getting the robot to do the dirty work.

Risk analysis

Does the potential threat to your organisation warrant investing in full-time detection and counter measures; is there a business case?

All bad-drone activity has a cost: a negative financial impact. You could ignore the issue, but the driver for your business case is the obligatory duty of care. Whether you are a corporate or government entity, duty of care – to your employees, stakeholders and patrons – is at the forefront of your mind and drives your decisions. At the very least, it is wise to have some form of ‘drone defence strategy’, even if it is only to assess if you actually have a problem and check the potential impact.

As a basis for your strategy you could use the OODA methodology: Observe, Orientate, Decide, Act.

Measuring and reporting

Starting with Observe, the security risk can be measured and historical benchmarks can be created by sensing for drones that come close to your assets.

Drones can be detected and tracked using hardware sensors – namely cameras, Radio Frequency (RF) receiver scanning, audio and radar – and software analytics to fuse the data together and collate reports.

For your business case to justify an investment in 24/7 automated detection and mitigation, you will be wanting to start with a report of recent activity; how many drones, what time of day, where did they fly. There are several companies that can be commissioned to deploy sensors and generate reports.

However, the drone-sensing market is evolving in a similar way to the mobile phone market in the early days. At first there were private wireless networks with their own infrastructure, then, as infrastructure

became commonplace, owners could utilise the capacity of each other and share the data space.

So today you can buy your own drone-sensing solution, but in the near future you will be able to buy sensing-as-a-service, effectively sharing the cost with your neighbours who have the same need.

Bright future

There’s more to come: changes to legislation; policing will need to differentiate between good and bad drones; insurance policies will need drone clauses, and more.

For security, the elephant in the room today is ‘Okay, I see the drone, what next?’ And that leads to the realisation that the bad-drone issue is not about the drone: it is about the pilot, and specifically the intent of the pilot. Locating the pilot in real time would be useful in many situations, as would sending the drone away. Technology is available for both options but it’s relatively new to the market, and it needs a business case to justify the cost.

There is more to explore on the good side too. Remember, according to the PwC report, 90% of our drone future is about enabling the commercial activity of good drones.

Jeremy Fitton

L3 ASA

www.L-3ASA.com

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In April 2015 in Tokyo, Yasuo Yamamoto protested about Japanese nuclear policy by landing a drone carrying a small amount of mildly radioactive sand on the roof of the Prime Minister’s Office.

This incident highlighted to the authorities the possible use of a drone in a terrorist attack.

Drones’ uses

Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or ‘drones’) are a mobile platform we now hear about on a day-to-day basis. They are simply an advancement of the existing technology of radio controlled aircraft which have been around for many years with the advantage that they are easier to fly ‘out of the box’.

Most hobby drones have a payload of a camera (<1kg) with a Wi-Fi or Bluetooth downlink to a mobile control and image viewing device.

Applications range from military UAVs used in a hostile environment, through commercial uses to those that assist farmers in crop management. Many smaller UAVs are available online or on the high street. On a risk basis, this article covers UAVs or ‘hobby drones’ that are under £1,000 and are readily available: one study has estimated 200,000 units are sold worldwide every month. They tend to be small: an advantage for surveillance but a drawback for payload delivery. Evidence from organised crime groups smuggling contraband shows something of their potential.

We consider the most sophisticated drones with large payloads to be out of reach of terror groups in the UK, at least for the foreseeable future. In addition, their usefulness to the adversary is offset by their likely visibility in development and testing. Probably the only aspect of rules and regulations that the adversary will be mindful of is the risk that someone might see a larger drone in testing and development and report it. The risk of detection and therefore failure to meet the attack objective (with loss of face) will tend to discourage the use of a drone when more reliable lower profile surveillance methods are available.

On the face of it, this appears to be a great tool for hostile reconnaissance by an adversary (though Google Earth and online public records might provide just as much information). However, the size of nuclear facilities means the controller of a drone would need to be close to the perimeter fence to remain in sight of the aircraft and would risk detection by conventional security measures. Using GPS, a drone can be pre-programmed to fly a specific route avoiding obstructions but it still needs to stay in contact with the satellite signals. The complex nature of a facility means any adversary would need inside knowledge of the layout of the plant to avoid signal disruption and maximise the range of the drone.

Drones and explosives

But what if the payload was to be replaced by explosives? A recent study by Oxford Research Group on the hostile use of drones against British targets concluded that they are a credible technological threat but that capacity (payload and range) remains limited.

We feel that this needs further assessment in the context of the mind of the adversary to provide a realistic risk assessment. But the technology exists and has been used aggressively.

In 2012 a Hezbollah ‘drone’ (allegedly provided by a sovereign state) was shot down by the Israeli Defence Force near their nuclear weapons facility at Dimona. This created a significant propaganda coup but the indications were that the UAV had limited capabilities beyond surveillance. These larger UAVs are out of our scope but the successful defence against them demonstrates that even they have vulnerabilities of their own.

However, if the adversary’s task is destruction, then a parachuting attacker who can target very specifically seems more likely to succeed in a nuclear plant than a remotely operated drone. Paragliding technology has already been used by Greenpeace to penetrate the French reactor site at Le Bugey, without violence.

Nuclear power stations’ security

All UK nuclear facilities have a robust security infrastructure, underpinned by a strong safety and security culture. There is a dedicated armed police force for UK nuclear sites, the Civil Nuclear Constabulary (CNC). They have considerable resources to call upon.

Worldwide, work is under way to develop passive and active counter measures to a drone attack, using jamming and even counter-drone drones. A shotgun is said to work wonders too.

Flying constraints

Flying is strictly controlled under the Air Navigation (Restriction of Flying) (Nuclear Installations) Regulations 2007 with UK nuclear installations subject to a ‘no flying zone’. This includes flights by drones. And it is enforced: in 2014, Robert Knowles from Cumbria was fined £800 for flying a drone within 50 metres of a nuclear facility. This was the first successful prosecution by the UK Civil Aviation Authority for illegal flying of an unmanned aircraft.

Legitimate hobby drones have to be flown within these strict flying constraints, but the determined adversary will not worry about these. So how realistic is the threat from hobby drones? It is possible that the camera could be replaced by a small explosive device which could be flown into a sensitive facility. If it is not spotted and defeated, it could be directed towards a specific target within a nuclear site.

However, due to their robust construction, facilities containing nuclear material are not likely to be breached. A typical US boiling water reactor has multiple layers of safety, with the containment vessel being constructed of 40mm steel, while the shield building wall is constructed of  >1000mm of reinforced concrete interlaced with steel rods. These multiple layers of safety provide about four metres of strong protection. We choose not to disclose UK power reactor containment structures in this article. Other areas of a nuclear site could be vulnerable, but are equally protected by multiple layers of safety, and are difficult to fly a drone into without the signal being lost.

Public confidence

However, any incident on a nuclear site, even without a release into the atmosphere, will cause headline news and a perception that nuclear power is unsafe. This will cause a loss of public confidence which will take many years to regain. This is perhaps the most credible threat of all – the ‘propaganda of the deed’ and the fear it would instil of a repeat and more effective attack.

In conclusion, the technology that drones use is ever advancing. Land and sea-based drones also exist (we used to call them remotely controlled cars and boats) and similar arguments apply to these. There are even submersibles. But we propose that simpler, more conventional solutions remain the weapon of choice for the terrorist. Even if regulations are introduced to control the purchase and use of hobby drones in the future, a drone could become a delivery method for explosives. Counter measures need continuing development. But if a terrorist wants to deliver explosives into the heart of a nuclear power plant, this can be most simply done with a missile or a mortar. Unfortunately, other targets may be much more vulnerable to ‘the attack of the drones’.

Tony Peters MIstLM, AIExpE

Chris Englefield CRadP, FSRP, FSyI, Nuclear Security Services

The authors are affiliated to the Security Institute’s new Nuclear Security Special Interest Group.

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Your view on drones – or UAVs (Unmanned Aviation Vehicles) as they are more accurately known – may be coloured by your experience or your role, but there is no doubt they are currently making an impact on many aspects of modern life, including the world of security, with almost daily references to their increasing use.

Amazon delivery drones

The most recent application to hit the general media is the development of delivery drones by the world’s largest internet retailer Amazon, as reported in The Guardian in March 2015:

“The company wants to offer its customers the ability to have packages dropped on their doorstep by flying robots within 30 minutes of ordering goods online. With innovation in the drone sector reaching lightning speeds… the company’s formidable team of roboticists, software engineers, aeronautics experts and pioneers in remote sensing – including a former Nasa astronaut and the designer of the wingtip of the Boeing 787 – are now operating in British Columbia.”

Wide range of uses

It is easy to see why people want to use UAVs: they can be a lot cheaper and quieter than helicopters, decrease the risk of those involved and can stay up longer than the endurance of a person. This means their application spans many different commercial uses, such as documentary filming, wildlife photography, precision agriculture and aerial surveys. They can be particularly useful for hard-to-reach structures, such as flue stacks on oil rigs or remote locations.

The charity Mèdecins Sans Frontiere recently reported how it is using UAVs to provide medical support for people cut off by impassable roads and dangerous crocodile-filled rivers in Papua New Guinea, to provide quick diagnosis of TB. Operated from a smart phone, its UAVs can travel up to 37mph with a range of 20 miles to carry up to 10 TB test samples from patients.

So it looks like UAVs are here to stay. Their use certainly polarises views and this is explored in a current exhibition at the Victoria and Albert Museum on the near-future use of drones in a city landscape. This includes a disturbing Nightwatchman surveillance drone tracking its objects through the streets.

Use by police

In reality, only a small number of police forces have begun to use UAVs, including Merseyside, West Midlands, Staffs and Essex. In March 2015, Sussex and Surrey Police reported that they have been awarded almost £250,000 to purchase five more UAVs as part of an ongoing trial.

This includes the use of a UAV at Gatwick Airport to see whether the equipment could provide a faster, safer and cheaper alternative to officer-led patrols in some circumstances.

Sussex and Surrey Police found that a UAV can cover a distance seven times quicker than officers on foot and can be used in conditions where it is unsafe for helicopters to fly or officers to go, such as smoky environments or when hazardous chemicals or materials have been spilled.

They believe that UAVs can be used to gather evidence from the air, such as at the scene of road, rail or air crashes, help with searches for missing or wanted people and to capture a broad picture of activities on the ground, such as the spread of flooding, the movement of people during public disorder or events at an armed incident.

Assistant Chief Constable Steve Barry, whose portfolio includes the joint Operations department for Sussex and Surrey Police, said “Some of the benefits of the UAV system have already been demonstrated during the relatively short period that we have had the equipment for.

“This is not about providing cut-price policing but about using technology to enhance the way we work. UAVs could prove extremely useful during a range of incidents.”

Drones and corporate security

With such a wide variety of uses and range of capability, it’s no surprise some security technology providers are keen to explore the use of UAVs and a number of applications have been in place for some time. In particular, those responsible for large estates and areas can find drones useful for enhancing remote surveillance. Nigel Arkwright, CTO at the Unipart Group, says, “Companies with CCTV monitoring are in the second wave of those to profit from the use of this technology after photography and film making. Any device with a camera is bound to spark privacy and we have all seen the media scare stories. Having CCTV trained and certified operatives proves a level of capability and training required for drone operators.”

Indeed, the increasing range of new uses can mean that those using UAVS are not generally those involved or experienced in aviation previously.

Regulating the use of UAVs

The Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) is responsible for regulating the safety of UAVs, irrespective of your reason for them. Gerry Corbett from CAA wants to keep their use as safe as possible; he says, “Once you put something into air, it has to come down at some point – so it has the potential to fall and injure people.” For those wanting to use UAVs for commercial reasons, or “aerial work” as it is known in the CAA regulations, then under certain circumstances, they will require an operations manual, and a licence from the CAA which will include a range of conditions. These licences last up to a year. “Any commercial organisation offering this kind of aerial work as part of their service should be well aware of the licensing arrangements and their responsibilities in this area.”

What the regulations say about recreational use

The regulations for the flight of small, unmanned aircraft also apply to recreational model aircraft flyers. However, provided there is no aerial work taking place, and unmanned aircraft fitted with cameras are not flown close to people or property, then permission is not required from the CAA; the aircraft must, however, be flown within the visual line of sight of the pilot at all times in order that the operator is able to prevent collisions.

Enthusiasts in general can, and do, fly models away from buildings and passers by. They are familiar with their surroundings and their models and do not need special permission. The same can be said for the majority of individuals who buy small UAVs with cameras, who don’t invade anyone’s privacy or endanger anyone.

Responding to UAVs near your premises

If you are a security officer or a police officer and spot a UAV, there are a number of key questions to consider:

• Intent – is the UAV being used for fun, for commercial reasons, for business, or something anti-social such as snooping?
• Equivalence – what would be an equivalent scenario, without a UAV; for example, if someone was using a camera on an extension stick, what would your response be?
• Appropriateness – how appropriate are the safety precautions they are taking? If you see a UAV near a building or built up area, then there are some simple questions to help evaluate whether the safety precautions are adequate:

– is the UAV within 500 metres of a building?

– Is the UAV within 50 metres of people?

– Is the UAV over 400 metres high?

If any of these are the case, you can ask the person in question, do you have CAA permission? Can I see it?

Invasion of Privacy and UAVs

The CAA regulations do not cover matters relating directly to privacy and the Data Protection Act only really applies to organisations and does not cover private use. However, The Information Commissioner’s Office has recently updated its guidance on surveillance cameras to include guidance on UAVs.

Individuals being bothered by UAVS

So what happens when people don’t abide by the regulations? The best advice is the same as for any form of anti-social or criminal behaviour: gather as much evidence as you can, such as ID of the individual and where and when it happened, and go to the police.

Summary of relevant offences

Small Unmanned Aircraft (SUA)

• A Small Unmanned Aircraft is any unmanned aircraft having a mass of 20kg or less (includes model aircraft)
• The Person in charge of the SUA (ie. the ‘pilot’) is responsible for ensuring the SUA is flown in a safe manner
• The pilot must keep the SUA within his/her direct, unaided visual contact
• SUA may only be flown for aerial work if the pilot has a permission to do so from the Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)

Small Unmanned Surveillance Aircraft (SUSA)

• SUSA is an SUA which is equipped to undertake any form of surveillance or data acquisition (e.g. cameras)
• CAA permission required to fly within the following limits:

– Over or within 150 metres of a  congested area

– Over or within 150 metres of organised open-air assembly of more than 1,000 persons

– Within 50 metres of vessel, vehicle or structure which is not under the control of the pilot

– Within 50 metres of any person (30 metres during take-off or landing). Does not apply to pilot or people under control of pilot

– A congested area in relation to a city, town or settlement.

By Andrea Berkoff

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