If you’re reading this article in your office, as many of us do, take a second to think about what decided the security measures protecting the building.

How was the level of security protection afforded to your people and assets by the building in which you are sitting determined?

If you’re a tenant in a multi-occupancy building, then the design process went something like this. The building was funded by a property developer; it was designed by an architect supported by a design team of engineers and consultants; and it was signed off at various stages by a local planning department and building control.

If your employer is the owner of the building, or maybe an anchor tenant who was involved early enough, perhaps you had some security-related input to the building’s design. For most though, that input is limited to designing security within your own tenant areas of the building, and negotiating with the building owner for the rest.

So if you didn’t determine the amount of consideration that security risk was given in the design of the building, who did?

If you didn’t sign off the finished designs and the completed building as providing suitable protection for the (at that stage possibly unknown) tenants, who did? Did security risk influence the layout or construction of the building? Or did your building just receive a templated version of security in the form of some video surveillance and electronic access control?

Apart from security, many of the other protective aspects of a commercial office building are mandated by Building Regulations. Protection from fire, for example, is covered in Building Regulations Part B, with a selection of means of meeting those requirements described in Approved Document B. Building structures are covered in Part A. Approved Document Q for security was released in 2015, but only applies to dwellings.

If consideration of security for commercial office buildings isn’t required by national Building Regulations, then we need to fall back on local planning requirements. In the UK, local planning departments issue Local Plans, informed by the National Planning Policy Framework. In July 2017 the Chief Planning Officer wrote to local planning authorities to remind them of “of the important role the planning system plays in ensuring appropriate measures are in place in relation to counter-terrorist and crime prevention security”. You can find the letter here: http://toren.co.uk/Chief_Planner

There are some areas in which the NPPF could improve its guidance on security risk, but it does already provide a context in which planners at local level can choose to require developments to consider all elements of ‘good design’. For example the NPPF refers to high risk sites, but there does not seem to be a common definition and regardless, such sites are hard to pin down as criminal and terrorist targets continue to evolve. However, security design does inherently support the ‘good design’ outcomes of the NPPF, such as enhancing amenity, well-being and community.

The London Plan

That being the case, let’s look at a Local Plan that is out for consultation at the moment. The London Plan is available at: http://toren.co.uk/London_Plan

In that draft plan, ‘Policy D10 Safety, security and resilience to emergency’ states that “Measures to design out crime, including counter terrorism measures, should be integral to development proposals and considered early in the design process. This will ensure they provide adequate protection, do not compromise good design, do not shift vulnerabilities elsewhere, and are cost-effective. Development proposals should incorporate measures that are proportionate to the threat of the risk of an attack and the likely consequences of one.”

The inclusion of this and other similar paragraphs is a positive development for the security and resilience of buildings in London. I’m sure that they’ll correct the somewhat mangled risk jargon in the last sentence in time for the final version of the Plan. Hopefully, more London boroughs and local plans from around the UK will follow suit.

Crime and, as we’ve been tragically reminded during 2017, terrorism aren’t confined to the capital. Manchester’s Local Plan, as a fairly typical example, obliges all developments to have regard to “community safety and crime prevention” and “reduction of opportunities for crime by applying current best practice in security design” but does not explicitly mention terrorism.

Built Environment Security SIG

A Built Environment Security Special Interest Group has recently been created out of a Memorandum of Understanding between the Security Institute and the Building Research Establishment. The SIG brings together security professionals and built environment stakeholders to improve security outcomes in the built environment and to raise professional standards.

The SIG also aims to influence the content of the updated National Planning Policy Framework, the aforementioned London Plan and other local plans, and to help them to provide as much benefit as possible to reducing crime and terrorism risks through quality building design.

If you’d like to attend the Built Environment Security Special Interest Group email me at: sig@security-institute.org

Mark Tucknutt

Toren Consulting mark.tucknutt@torenconsulting.co.uk www.torenconsulting.co.uk

The post Built Environment Security: how much is enough? appeared first on City Security Magazine.

As building control increasingly moves into the IT sphere, the importance of cyber security is growing in tandem. Gartner recently predicted that, by 2020, more than 25% of all identified attacks in enterprises will come from the Internet of Things.

Worldwide spending on smart security will reach $348m in 2016, a 23.7% increase from 2015 spending of $281.5m. By 2018, this figure will be closer to $547m.

The security implications of putting buildings ‘online’ should not be shied away from. Physical infrastructure is inherently more vulnerable once connected to the digital world.

Understandable, then, that 87% of facilities managers, security personnel and others involved in the management and protection of buildings are at least ‘somewhat concerned’ about the cyber security vulnerabilities posed by smart tech. Polled as part of IFSEC Global’s recent survey on smart buildings, a further 43% professed to being ‘very concerned’. Nevertheless, that even 13% insist they are ‘not concerned at all’ might alarm some observers given widespread reports about the vulnerabilities of internet-connected ‘things’.

Vulnerabilities laid bare

IBM’s ethical hacking team, X-Force, recently conducted a penetration test of a remote building automation system that controlled sensors and thermostats in several commercial offices. X-Force found a way into one of the building’s networks via a vulnerable router.  Poor password management meant the team easily accessed the local Building Automation System (BAS) controller and eventually wrested complete control of the central BAS server.

IBM’s penetration test illustrates the enormous potential for disaster in this new world of smart things. However, X-Force was only able to access the BAS due to a series of security lapses. It is a mistake to assume that the buck always stops with the vendor.

“The vendors have a responsibility to ensure that their solutions meet the expectations of the customer,” says Stuart Higgins, head of digital impact for Cisco UK and Ireland. “That they are up to date in terms of the vulnerability landscape and that they are patching both their hardware and software on a regular basis. But,equally, the customer can’t wash their hands of responsibility. It’s no one individual or organisation’s responsibility; it’s a collective duty.”

In 2014, security consultant Jesus Molina told US cyber security conference Black Hat that he had commandeered control of the lighting, HVAC and entertainment systems of 200 rooms at a hotel in Chinese city Shenzhen.

A year before that, the US Department of Homeland Security revealed hackers had broken into a “state government facility” and made it “unusually warm”. Google’s Sydney office was hacked through its building management system in the same year. Two cyber security experts discovered the vulnerabilities via IoT search engine Shodan.

Speaking to the BBC, one of these ‘benign’ hackers, Billy Rios, claimed there are 50,000 buildings currently connected to the internet, 2,000 of which lack any kind of password protection. Conducted by more malevolent actors, the consequences of such breaches could be significant, with disruption to office buildings that costs thousands of pounds in lost productivity sitting at the less serious end of the scale. If the heating system in a hospital or care home was disabled, for example, the upshot could even be loss of life.

Disruption

Hacks of building systems have already caused profound disruption. In 2013, the theft of millions of customers’ credit card data from US retailer Target was traced back to the heating and ventilation system. More alarming still, a Ukrainian power station was disabled immediately before Christmas in 2015 by a spear-phishing attack – where an employee is duped into downloading malware, usually via email – leaving around 80,000 Ukrainian citizens without power.

Martyn Thomas, a professor of IT at Gresham College, told the BBC “that attempts to attack building management systems are happening all the time […] These BMS systems have hundreds of thousands of lines of code, and yet the average programmer makes 20 mistakes in every 1,000 lines of code, so there are lot of bugs there.” Respondents to our survey were polarised over the magnitude of the hacking threat to building management systems. Those who were more relaxed about the risk seemed to have one of two main reasons. The first, expressed by an office-based facilities manager, was that their system “had no physical connection to the outside world”. Similarly, a senior executive in the industrial/warehouse sector said, “no life-critical applications will go on publicly connected networks”.

But even if hackers could access a BMS network, it doesn’t follow that they would have a compelling motive for doing so, according to one integrator: “I work solely in the residential market. My view is that if anyone has the capability to hack my home then they would be more inclined to hack a company for political reasons, or a bank for money. Security is important, but if I worry about this I’d never install any smart equipment. I rely on the hardware purchased for this purpose.”

But can you rely on the hardware? Not so, said one security consultant who believes that ‘security by design’ has only “been addressed in a limited way as only a few leaders recognise the issue and manufacturers do not ensure the products are secure, despite the PR”. A company director cited cyber risk as “one of our main reasons for inaction” when it comes to installing smart technologies.

A health and safety professional offered a balanced view of the risk, saying that “while no critical systems are likely to be integrated” into smart networks “anytime soon, outside influences potentially being able to make changes via networked tech, even if it only means switching the lights off, can be a costly nuisance”.

Adam Bannister Editor of FSEC Global

The post The danger of using smart building security appeared first on City Security Magazine.

At last the security industry is starting to use automation to improve efficiency in ways that have been standard practice in the manufacturing and IT sectors for years. In an IT department for example, it would be unthinkable to manually collect the IP configuration from a set of workstations, or for a manufacturing plant to have human workers assembling microscopic electronics by hand. Of course, these jobs are automated, taking advantage of the efficiency, accuracy, and eventually the cost savings, that machines and computers can bring.

Yet until recently, automation has been absent from the electronic security industry. Technical drawings are routinely marked up by hand, with device counting and configuration manually processed – often inaccurately – into documentation. When you add costing into the equation it is easy to see how the final pricing for a given job can vary wildly between vendors. And it doesn’t stop there: when the documentation is processed into end-system programming – by hand – additional time is spent, not to mention the increased potential for error.

It’s a familiar problem for global businesses striving for consistency in their security systems, and until recently, there was no answer, other than to micro-manage vendors across regions, adding time that is uncosted and hard to come by.

Automation comes into use

Now though, we are finally seeing automation make its way into our industry. With automated generation of documentation and system programming, vendors are able to use their technical workforce more, concentrating on the challenging aspects of an installation rather than data entry tasks. Automation gives end users peace of mind that their defined “standard” is being adhered to regardless of geographical location, and improves the efficiency of vendors. Sophisticated automated systems bring enormous benefits and the entire supply chain. It’s been a long time coming, but now automation is here, it’s here to stay.

Patrick Biggin, Head of Research & Innovation, QCIC Group

The post Automation being used in electronic security appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Building Information Modelling (BIM) is the next evolution in building design and operation. BIM processes and technology are increasingly adopted by property developers, owners and building operators due to the significant commercial and operational advantages they offer, as well a government mandate for application in centrally-procured public projects.

Security design for the built environment involves construction and fit-out projects with varying levels of BIM adoption. Those at the forefront in this field naturally develop design capabilities into BIM but must remain mindful of the potential security risks of uncontrolled sharing of building information. This article describes some of the benefits and risks associated with BIM for the security of a building or organisation.

What is BIM?

Unless you are involved or about to be involved in a construction project, you may not have come across the term. Even if you have, there are varying definitions of this emerging combination of process and technology. My favourite definition to lead into the benefits and risks for security professionals comes from NBS, one of the bodies leading the standardisation of BIM: “[BIM is] simply the means by which everyone can understand a building through the use of a digital model.”

Depending on the perspective of the reader, BIM can be either an enhancement of 3D Computer Aided Design (CAD) to include more information and automate some design tasks, or a total paradigm shift in the construction and engineering industries. For the security professional it can be both an incredible tool for designing security into new buildings and collaborating with other specialists, and at the same time a potential source of risk when the sharing of sensitive information is not controlled.

What are the benefits of BIM for security professionals?

In a typical construction project, say a new corporate HQ, there will be a senior security management representative on the client side and a security consultancy on the design team side. If BIM is fully adopted and appropriately used then there will be significant benefits to both the security designer and the client security design stakeholder who will ultimately be responsible for the security of the completed building.

For security consultants the main benefits are similar to those for other design team specialists, such as modelling of security-specific elements including realistic views from CCTV cameras; automated ‘clash detection’; verification of the design in a virtual environment; ease of coordination with other specialists; speed of quantification and cost control tasks; and of course, more effective presentation to the client and other stakeholders.

For security managers, depending on the level of BIM expertise in the wider design team, and the security consultant in particular, there can be significant benefits not only during design but in operation of the completed building. Stakeholders can be more easily involved in the project to a greater depth, and their requirements and changes incorporated more easily.

These are the commonly discussed selling points of BIM adoption, but as the level of detail captured in the model increases, so does the potential for more intelligent analysis and interpretation, which we are beginning to see with, for example, energy modelling.

In the security design space BIM data provides an opportunity to change the way in which risks are identified and how mitigation techniques are measured effectively. At the simple end of the scale this may be providing a client with photorealistic 3D CCTV coverage maps; the tools to allow this basic overlay are already freely available from reputed manufacturers. Such simple tools provide an immediate enhancement to a security designer’s capability but there is potential to look further ahead to explore exciting opportunities for innovative client interaction, design and post occupancy support.

As an example, the criticality of spaces may be inferred using COBIE (Construction Operations Building Information Exchange) information already captured in the BIM model, allowing a designer to better prioritise the application of physical and technical security.

Once the building is in use, live usage statistics from the installed security devices could be used in combination with BIM model information to allow accurate failure prediction and more efficient and cost-effective maintenance contracts. As the quantity of information captured within BIM models continues to grow, security designers will increasingly be expected to demonstrate modelling, programming and analysis capability to allow clients to visualise their building.

What are the risks?

There are currently some immediate risks to entering into a fully BIM-designed construction project when compared to a ‘traditional’ CAD-based approach. These are essentially centred on the emerging nature of BIM and include additional effort on behalf of the client to get up to speed with BIM tools and capabilities, and the fact that not all design disciplines or specialists within a discipline are yet equally competent in understanding BIM, using the associated tools or maximising the benefits for the client.

These early adoption issues are beginning to disappear as the construction industry more widely adopts and implements BIM, and as standards continue to be developed. The post Security Minded Approach to Digital Engineering on the CPNI website provides guidance on latest standards.

This takes the reader through a process which allows the benefits of BIM to still be achieved, but introduces an appropriate and proportionate need-to-know approach in relation to the sharing and publication of information that could be exploited by those with hostile or malicious intent.

This process creates a new role, the Built Asset Security Manager (BASM), whose functions will exist not only during a project, but over the lifetime of the asset. Using combined knowledge of security and BIM, the role will be responsible for providing a holistic view of the security issues and threats to be addressed, as well as taking ownership for, and assisting in, the development, auditing and review of the resultant policies, processes and procedures.

For example, the BASM should set and manage the rules that ensure the entire design team does not receive access to the CCTV programming and configuration information.

In our recent experience, the inclusion of this standard in project BIM protocols has been inconsistent; however, the adoption of a security-minded approach should be considered in: the construction of new assets; the modification, fitting-out and maintenance of those already existing; the collection of asset information; the introduction of new building management systems; and when considering potential relocation options or disposal of assets.

Conclusions

Security professionals have an opportunity to drive the use of BIM in construction and fit-out projects for the good of our sector. While the processes, tools and standards used in designing and operating buildings using BIM models are developing, we can drive both the expectations of security design information and collaboration and the requirements that are placed on the secure management of building information.

While the adoption of BIM on projects and the extent to which its capabilities are used varies tremendously, this is the time for security managers to explore BIM’s benefits and for security consultants to plan to exceed their clients’ expectations. As dynamic users of a building, and one of the few who consider not just steady state but exception operation, we should be leading proponents of a technology that can help us to get things right first time and to understand the impact of new threats and opportunities as they emerge.

www.qcic-group.com

(updated CPNI links in May 2022)

The post Building Information Modelling and Security appeared first on City Security Magazine.

To innovate is to ‘make changes in something established, especially by introducing new methods, ideas or products’. Some security professionals would argue that security design and security management are not disciplines that should readily submit to innovation; tried and tested is the way. Others follow the maxim of Francis Bacon, who declared that ‘He that will not apply new remedies must expect new evils; for time is the greatest innovator’. What is innovation in security, and how readily should it be embraced by those of us who design and operate security systems?

From an outsider’s perspective, it could be argued security technology has not changed significantly over the last decade or so. Where there were CCTV cameras there are still CCTV cameras. Where a card is used to gain access via an automated access control system and a turnstile, that process still takes place. When we take a look ‘under the bonnet’ though, we can see that there is technical innovation in security. Those analogue PAL CCTV cameras may have been replaced by digital megapixel units providing increased performance, or perhaps by providing information for automated video analytics. The 125kHz proximity card that was used for access control may have been replaced with a secure encrypted 13.56MHz card.

Innovation in security design

As with any other business discipline, innovation in security involves risk and is often therefore constrained by a number of factors. Standards and ‘best practice’ govern security equipment design and operation in many areas. This provides reassurance, that systems on which people depend for the protection of their property and their lives are capable of performing when required. The industry is not short of cautionary tales of security equipment manufacturers making claims which, under appropriate testing, were found to be untrue.

When a true technical innovation occurs, it is often swiftly imitated. For the end user, the multitude of systems claiming amazing performance in a new field can be overwhelming. For manufacturers, the products that actually perform can be lost

in a sea of more aggressively marketed competitors. In such a business environment standards and rigorous testing should not restrict innovation, but support it.

A great example of where standards have helped to guide innovation and reassure users is the UK Government I-LIDS (Imagery Library for Intelligent Detection Systems) programme (gov.uk/imagery-library-for-intelligent-detection-systems). This programme provides a means by which video-based detection systems can be rigorously evaluated using the same video sequences related to specific scenarios. Successfully tested systems are permitted to use the I-LIDS logo in their marketing material, thereby assisting both the manufacturer in marketing and the end user in product selection.

Physical security

Similar examples exist in physical security as well as electronic. QCIC has worked to design innovative hostile vehicle mitigation measures where projects are unsuitable for conventional bollards. Those designs were formally impact tested to the same degree that a manufacturer’s new bollard design would be tested prior to construction. The Catalogue of Impact Tested Vehicle Security Barriers contains not just traditional bollards but a good number of innovative designs tested to PAS 68 (shop.bsigroup.com).

Without formal testing and approval, many security stakeholders would instinctively shy away from using innovative products in such a critical situation as preventing the delivery of terrorist vehicle bombs. But with documented and repeatable test results, the security designer can select from a far more flexible range of options.

In other areas though, it seems that standards, or in some cases the cost of testing to them, prohibit the development or the adoption of innovative products. The link between intruder alarm standards and police or insurance requirements, for example, is felt by some to stifle innovation. A number of recently released products in that field have sought to apply the same aesthetics, flexibility and ease of use that are being developed in other home automation products. But with no apparent compliance with current European intruder alarm standards, their adoption in the UK may be limited.

Flexible standards

This disparity in innovation between technical areas within the security industry is perhaps determined by the nature of the standards that guide them. I-LIDS, PAS 68 and other performance-based standards such as LPS 1175 (redbooklive.com) for manual attack resistance allow a greater degree of flexibility in design than more proscriptive standards such as the BS EN 50131 intruder alarm series. This is not to say that standards such as BS EN 50131 series should not be appreciated or adopted. 50131 has provided stringent grading of intruder alarm systems based on, for example, components and functions required in different types of sensor, which has helped to ensure that appropriately graded equipment is installed for different levels of security within developments. However, if a new type of detector is invented tomorrow with fantastic performance, it would not be able to be graded as there would not be a category for it within the standard.

Thieves will continue to develop more sophisticated tools. Terrorists will acquire more powerful weapons. The technical measures that security professionals use to mitigate the risks from these groups must continue to adapt. To achieve this while maintaining security will require the designers and managers of security to continue to innovate with the technology that we deploy and the ways that we use it. In so doing, we must be mindful of the standards that are in place, their strengths and weaknesses to make sure that we apply them in the most appropriate way for the security threats that we face.

Mark Tucknutt MPhys, MSc, CPhys, Associate Director, QCIC Group (at time of writing)

www.qcic-group.com

The post Security design: balancing innovation and security appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Terrorist tactics and the associated threat advice from government and the police evolve continually. Current threat assessments contain an increased focus on marauding attacks, by individuals or groups and using improvised weapons or firearms. How and to what extent should the design of new and iconic buildings seek to reduce the risk of such events, and what does CT design look like in 2014?

Firstly, it would be myopic to design security for a building that may not be completed for five years and has an intended life of decades based entirely on this year’s terrorist threat trends.

As those of us in the security design trade routinely opine, retrofitting of security measures often leads to more unsightly, expensive and less-effective solutions. The threat from vehicle-borne attacks in particular has not disappeared, and a relative lack of recent incidents in the West should not lead to a disregard for blast design in structures and glazing where appropriate.

Hostile vehicle mitigation

Explosive effects and hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) design are relatively mature disciplines in the UK, and are commonly accepted as part of the overall architectural design process. Good security designers may still struggle with others’ preconceptions involving rows of bollards, but there are now enough creative and sympathetic examples of HVM measures designed in harmony with the building aesthetic that those can normally be overcome.

All types of attack require a degree of planning and preparation, which provides us with an early opportunity to detect and deter a potential attack.

Hostile reconnaissance detection

Hostile reconnaissance detection, through staff on the ground or via CCTV, is increasingly understood as a valuable skill for private security teams as well as the police. Similarly, projecting an image of a well-managed and protected site, again via a combination of operational and technical means, can deter an attack and deflect the planners to an alternative target.

Public or publicly-accessible locations are likely to be preferred for the relatively recent terrorist tactic of the marauding attack, as indicated in the murder of Drummer Lee Rigby in Woolwich in May 2013 and the attack on the Westgate mall in Nairobi in September 2013.

For the design of high profile new buildings, this means that those with publicly-accessible spaces may consider how to deter and how to respond to such an attack. One immediate challenge for a security consultant working on design-led buildings is to provide deterrence and a degree of control without creating a ‘fortress’ in appearance or perception.

This can be achieved through detailed collaboration and coordinated efforts with both the architect and landscape designers on the location and the appearance of security equipment.

Police response

The ability to intervene in a firearms attack in the UK is effectively limited to police firearms teams. We are fortunate to have a mature capability in that regard, particularly in London and The City. Security design can support a police response to any incident by helping the building’s security team to provide intelligence and communication. This may mean giving access to the building’s radio and CCTV systems, either externally or in a control room if it remains secure.

Technically, providing a link to a modern CCTV system should be readily achievable and, of course, can be limited to emergency use only. Similarly, radio communications can be extended to the police by maintaining spare handsets, or, in larger developments, by providing direct integration between both building and public safety communication systems.

Control rooms in security design

All of the above measures are more easily achieved via a secure and well-designed security control room or incident management suite. This may mean determining not only how the control room is laid out to facilitate both day-to-day and incident use, but also its location and whether it is provided with appropriate resistance to manual, ballistic and blast threats.

This is perhaps the most significant addition to security design of some buildings in relation to the emerging terrorist threat pattern. While many control rooms are equipped to manage crime, or even deal with the aftermath of an explosive attack, the resilience to a determined targeted attack and the ability to continue to function and provide intelligence during an incident should also be considered. With available physical security equipment such as manual attack and ballistic rated doors and windows, and via detailed coordination with the architect and design team, a building can be equipped to minimise the impact of this new threat should it occur.

Thankfully, as we have seen, many of the tools needed to reduce the attractiveness and impact of current trends in terrorist attacks are part of the existing tool-kits of security managers and designers in the UK.

Overlapping measures

There is a considerable overlap between physical, electronic and operational measures intended to reduce crime or mitigate the risk of other forms of terrorist attack and those which help to deter and to manage, for example, a marauding firearms attack.

Just as security threats continue to evolve, so do architectural trends and building techniques. It will remain the responsibility of the security designer to help clients to get the buildings that they want, while allowing them to feel comfortable that the building design and the associated physical and electronic security measures will assist in the continuing requirement to deter, detect, delay and deny attacks.

Mark Tucknett MPhys, MSc, CPhys, QCIC Group (at time of writing)

www.qcic-group.com

The post Intelligent security design to counter terrorism appeared first on City Security Magazine.

Designing a building involves ticking many regulatory boxes with a strong emphasis placed on the environmental and energy performance of the building. However, consideration should be given to how the completed building will be secured, as real cost savings can be made when security measures are incorporated early into the design says Kevin Ward, Executive Director of Ward Security.

In 2007, Gordon Brown committed to working with architects and designers to encourage them to design-in protective security measures into new buildings. All major new public buildings were to have anti-terrorist measures built into their design, in particular to stop suicide bombers. Today, security is becoming a key issue in the design and construction of all new buildings, not simply of high profile stadiums, hospitals or high terrorist targets. Corporate offices and business parks take security precautions seriously, recognising the business cost from a security breach can be seriously high and that it pays to look after the safety of the people working in the building.

Building design

When a new building is designed it is typically built to look on trend and provide an ergonomic, first class working environment so that on its completion, the building owner can let those office premises quickly and for the maximum cost per square foot. When the tenants begin to move in it is quite often the first time that the security of the building starts to be scrutinised. New or old, every building should be risk assessed to make sure it operates safely and securely. Collaborating at the early stages of design, means the security can be integrated into the design avoiding difficult and costly retrofitting of security mechanisms.

A consistent problem we come across when risk assessing the security of a new building arises from the modern trend of fitting oversized glass entrance and exit doors. While they look stunning and let lots of light into a building, they are problematic to secure, particularly in properties where lots of tenants need 24 hour access to each floor. It is impractical to have an intruder alarm installed so what tends to happen is, when the security guard goes home, these oversized doors are secured on a single magnetic lock which, when given a good shake, is relatively easy for an intruder to open.

Security design

What designers want and what security professionals need often clash. We crave pinch points when architects want smooth sleek lines and this is particularly evident when it comes to the interior design of the reception area. Correct positioning of motion detection sensors and cameras is a classic example, as most are tucked up so high it alters the capability of them to work. The reason they are positioned out of the way is to avoid spoiling the interior look of the reception area, but these sensors have much too important a job to be hidden away.

We came across this recently following the refurbishment of a Grade 2 listed building in Piccadilly. The new reception area had an extremely minimalist look with one small reception desk, a single computer, telephone and nothing else. However, this building’s reception had three separate entrances, but only one was visible from the reception desk and the CCTV was incorrectly positioned, as practical consideration to the blind spots in the reception area had not been thought through. The CCTV images were also very blurred because of the lighting used in the area. So while it looked nice it was insufficiently secured.

In terms of lighting, generally LED bulbs are best as they are cheap to run, come in a variety of colours and, best of all, do not affect the quality of the CCTV images because of the density of the light they produce.

While we can retrofit and incorporate new measures, it is impractical to drill through marble floors and often there is restricted access to ceilings, so adding in ducting and cabling starts to be difficult, and with less flexibility the installation or moving of a key piece of security can begin to cost a small fortune.

Considering security in building design

There is also a noticeable trend towards providing three or four entrances and exits to office car parks. This means there is an increased need for six or seven cameras to properly secure the car park; however, just altering the design will reduce the number of cameras necessary and the number of barriers required.

Given that security personnel are generally the people in the building the longest, often providing 24 hour cover, it is really important they have access to basic facilities to help them operate – they need toilets, somewhere to store a bag and make a cup of tea – it’s surprising how often that is forgotten about. The use of ceiling-high glass atriums in reception areas again looks fantastic but can make life pretty uncomfortable for the security guard who sits roasting in the summer and freezing in the winter.

Integrated security

Finally, making sure your security systems can integrate with each other sounds obvious, but while you would expect most pieces of equipment to be able to talk to each other, occasionally they don’t and no one wants to rip out a brand new piece of kit – it’s expensive, wasteful and mostly annoying!

Collaboration with security experts at an early stage is the solution. We can produce cost effective and safer solutions from often very minor layout changes.

Kevin Ward

Executive Director, Ward Security

www.wardsecurity.co.uk

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